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Author: |
Denise Lind |
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Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
"United States versus Private First Class Manning, Article 13, Unlawful Pretrial Confinement |
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Archive Link |
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2008-02-29 |
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Author: |
Denise Lind |
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Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
"United States versus Private First Class Manning, Article 13, Unlawful Pretrial Confinement |
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Archive Link |
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Author: |
Denise Lind |
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Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
"United States versus Private First Class Manning, Article 13, Unlawful Pretrial Confinement |
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Archive Link |
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Author: |
Denise Lind |
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Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
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Classification: |
For Official Use Only |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
Central Command, CENTCOM, Department of Defense |
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Audience: |
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) for Afghanistan |
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Notes: |
The document is later published by WikiLeaks on February 12, 2009. |
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Author: |
Jim Garamone |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
American Forces Press Service, Department of Defense |
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Author: |
Denise Lind |
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Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
"United States versus Private First Class Manning, Article 13, Unlawful Pretrial Confinement |
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Archive Link |
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Author: |
Tiffany Evans |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
10th Mountain Division, Department of Defense |
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I am announcing a decision to temporarily increase the active-duty end strength of the Army by up to 22,000. That is a temporary increase from the current authorized end -- permanent end strength of 547,000 to an authorized temporary end strength of 569,000 active-duty soldiers.
[...]
Q ...A couple weeks, now, past the June 30th [2009] handover of control in the cities in Iraq, how do you assess the level of cooperation and the level of tension between U.S. forces and Iraqi forces, particularly in Baghdad? There's been a couple of reports of disagreements or even stand-offs over who gets to do what when. Are you convinced that you have the authority you need to protect the force and that you can operate as you need to?
SEC. GATES: I received a report from General Odierno just today that addressed this issue. And he said that the level of cooperation and collaboration with the Iraqi security forces is going much better than is being portrayed publicly and in the media. So my impression from his reporting, and not just this week but over the last couple of weeks, has been that it's actually, in his view, going quite well.
[...]
Q Mr. Secretary and Admiral, there seems to have been a change, both substantively and rhetorically, coming out of Iraq, where, substantively, lower-level American commanders say that they're being asked to provide route convoy information before they leave, which they worry about for obvious security reasons. And rhetorically, there were comments today, which I was struck by, from the spokesperson for the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, who was describing America's soldiers in Iraq as being under house arrest. He said that: They're getting impatient because we confine them to their bases, which are like big prisons; they're under house arrest. So, two questions. One, substantively: How confident are you that the safety of American troops is being protected, given that you have commanders speaking openly with fears that it is not currently as safe as it could be? But, two, if the Iraqis see our presence there as putting us under house arrest, putting our soldiers into that prison, why are we there?
SEC. GATES: Well, first of all, I think that I certainly have not heard anything from General Odierno that would indicate that our soldiers have been put at increased risk. And second, it is perhaps a measure of our success in Iraq that politics have come to the country.
[...]
Q Senator Gillibrand is talking about adding a -- an amendment to the Defense Authorization Bill that would give an 18- month moratorium on 'don't ask, don't tell.' Do you support that -- such an amendment being added? And some have noted that there's been a change of tone from this building about 'don't ask, don't tell.' Earlier this year you said, 'It's the law; we will implement the law.' Later you said you were looking at ways to bend the law. Why the change in tone?
SEC. GATES: Well, for one thing, we have a new president -- (chuckles) -- who has a different policy, and we will support what his goal is here. I'm not going to speak to specific legislation. I would just say this: that if -- first of all, we -- even as we look for ways to apply the law more humanely and as we look at how we might begin to implement the law, the only thing -- a change in the law, should that happen -- the only thing we have continued to say, and I think certainly I believe, and I think I can speak for the chairman in this, is that if the law does change, then it is important that the implementation be deliberate and careful. This is not something that should be -- in my view, should be done abruptly, because I think that we have a force under great stress in two wars, and to try and do something abruptly, I think, would be a real concern.
Q Have you taken any steps to apply the law more humanely, as you said?
SEC. GATES: We're still looking at that. |
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Name(s:) |
Robert Gates |
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Title: |
Secretary of Defense |
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Agency(ies): |
Department of Defense |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/Ss3sW |
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Q A question for both of you, please. A couple weeks, now, past the June 30th handover of control in the cities in Iraq, how do you assess the level of cooperation and the level of tension between U.S. forces and Iraqi forces, particularly in Baghdad? There's been a couple of reports of disagreements or even stand-offs over who gets to do what when. Are you convinced that you have the authority you need to protect the force and that you can operate as you need to?
[...]
ADM. MULLEN: All discussions I've had with General Odierno, including one midweek last week, about this issue have been very positive. Certainly there are challenges. I would point out the independent effort that the Iraqi forces provided recently in terms of providing security for the visit of many, many Iraqis to a very sacred mosque. And that, as an example -- the -- we continue to clearly work with them. But from the time actually before the 30th of June when we had been pulling out of cities until up to now, it's been positive. There clearly are challenges, but I think the leadership is working its way through each one of those challenges. So I'm encouraged.
[...]
Q Mr. Secretary and Admiral, there seems to have been a change, both substantively and rhetorically, coming out of Iraq, where, substantively, lower-level American commanders say that they're being asked to provide route convoy information before they leave, which they worry about for obvious security reasons. And rhetorically, there were comments today, which I was struck by, from the spokesperson for the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, who was describing America's soldiers in Iraq as being under house arrest. He said that: They're getting impatient because we confine them to their bases, which are like big prisons; they're under house arrest. So, two questions. One, substantively: How confident are you that the safety of American troops is being protected, given that you have commanders speaking openly with fears that it is not currently as safe as it could be? But, two, if the Iraqis see our presence there as putting us under house arrest, putting our soldiers into that prison, why are we there?
...
ADM. MULLEN: What I would only add to that is, being -- having been in Kirkuk the other day and spending the better part of the day with the brigade commander there, who has been there over a half a year, his interaction with the security forces, both police as well as the army -- and in addition, he's in a spot where he's looking at the interface between Peshmerga as well as the Iraqi army, as well. And believe me, the idea that he was somehow either handcuffed or unable to do what he's doing -- was -- what he's supposed to do, it just never came up. |
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Name(s:) |
Mike Mullen |
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Title: |
Chair |
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Agency(ies): |
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/vXH5F |
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Author: |
John Kruzel |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
American Forces Press Service, Department of Defense |
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Title: |
Defense Department Briefing |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
CSPAN Video Library |
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Author: |
Denise Lind |
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Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
"United States versus Private First Class Manning, Article 13, Unlawful Pretrial Confinement |
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Archive Link |
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Author: |
Denise Lind |
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Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
"United States versus Private First Class Manning, Article 13, Unlawful Pretrial Confinement |
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Archive Link |
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Author: |
Tiffany Evans |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
10th Mountain Division, Department of Defense |
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Title: |
Experts dispel suicide myths |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
United States Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine |
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Title: |
Help available for behavioral health life-threatening emergencies |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
Behavioral Health Department, United States Army Medical Department Activity, MEDDAC |
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Author: |
Denise Lind |
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Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
"United States versus Private First Class Manning, Article 13, Unlawful Pretrial Confinement |
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Archive Link |
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Army Maj. Gen. James L. Terry, commanding general of the 10th Mountain Division; Army Col. David M. Miller, commander of the division's 2nd Brigade Combat Team; and Army Lt. Col. Michael N. Davey, 2nd BCT deputy commander, conduct an inspection by 'trooping the line' during a Sept. 25, 2009, deployment ceremony at Fort Drum, N.Y. U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Jennie M. Burrett |
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Name(s:) |
Jennie Burrett |
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Title: |
2nd Brigade Combat Team PAO NCOIC |
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Agency(ies): |
United States Army, Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
2nd Brigade Combat Team 10th Mountain Division |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/5hIFC |
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Author: |
Jennie Burrett |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
Public Affairs, 2nd Brigade Combat Team 10th Mountain Division, Department of Defense |
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Title: |
2nd BCT Soldiers prepare for upcoming deployment |
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Author: |
Rebecca Schwab |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
Public Affairs, 2nd Brigade Combat Team 10th Mountain Division |
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Title: |
10th Mountain Division 'Commandos' Set to Return to Dramatically Improved Iraq |
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Author: |
Donna Miles |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
American Forces Press Service, Department of Defense |
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Author: |
Denise Lind |
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Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
"United States versus Private First Class Manning, Article 13, Unlawful Pretrial Confinement |
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Archive Link |
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Author: |
Denise Lind |
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Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
"United States versus Private First Class Manning, Article 13, Unlawful Pretrial Confinement |
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Archive Link |
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Author: |
Matthew Diaz |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
10th Mountain Division, Department of Defense |
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Author: |
Michael Carden |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
American Forces Press Service, Department of Defense |
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Title: |
Commander meets press at round-table conference |
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Author: |
Matthew Diaz |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
10th Mountain Division, Department of Defense |
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Title: |
US v. Pfc. Manning Court Ruling on defense Article 13 motion |
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Author: |
Denise Lind |
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Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
"United States versus Private First Class Manning, Article 13, Unlawful Pretrial Confinement |
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Archive Link |
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Title: |
Defense Request for Article 32 Witnesses |
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Author: |
David Coombs |
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Title: |
civilian defense counsel |
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Concerning: |
"United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning |
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Title: |
US v. Pfc. Manning Court Ruling on defense Article 13 motion |
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Author: |
Denise Lind |
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Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
"United States versus Private First Class Manning, Article 13, Unlawful Pretrial Confinement |
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Archive Link |
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Title: |
US v. Pfc. Manning Court Ruling on defense Article 13 motion |
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Author: |
Denise Lind |
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Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
"United States versus Private First Class Manning, Article 13, Unlawful Pretrial Confinement |
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Archive Link |
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Q: (Inaudible) ' quoted in the WikiLeaks cables here ' (inaudible) ' documents as saying that, you know, it's very hard to get tough with your banker. Do you ' talking about China. Do you have ' is that ' would you agree overall with that and because the Chinese have said that in some quarters they see us as a declining power because of our financial crisis, does that change the nature of the talks with the Chinese from 2007 to now?
SECRETARY GATES: Certainly not from my standpoint. My ' I make the broader point with people because I've watched this sort of cyclical view of American decline come around two or three times, perhaps most dramatically in the latter half of the 1970s. And my general line for those both at home and around the world who think the U.S. is in decline ' that history's dustbin is filled with countries that underestimated the resilience of the United States. And I think that ' I mean, the economic relationship between the United States and China is mutually beneficial. It's not a one-way street. And so I think both countries have an interest in keeping that stable and going forward. So I ' that kind of thing doesn't ' you know, the ' that kind of thing really doesn't much enter into in my thinking. |
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Name(s:) |
Robert Gates |
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Title: |
Secretary of Defense |
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Agency(ies): |
Department of Defense |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/rc3zf |
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Title: |
U.S. turns over training of Iraqi Federal Police |
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Author: |
Jeff Hansen |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
366th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment, Department of Defense |
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Title: |
News: Iraqi Federal Police take charge at Task Force Nassir Academy |
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Author: |
Ryan Sabin |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
Public Affairs, 2nd Brigade Combat Team 10th Mountain Division |
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Archive Link |
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Title: |
News: Cavalry Soldiers let Federal Police take over training at TF Nassir |
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Author: |
Ryan Sabin |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
Public Affairs, 2nd Brigade Combat Team 10th Mountain Division |
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Archive Link |
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Title: |
Panel to explore ending 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell' |
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Author: |
John Kruzel |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
American Forces Press Service, Department of Defense |
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Title: |
Department of Defense Authoirzation for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2011, and To Receive Testimony Relating to the 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell' Policy |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
Senate Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate |
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Title: |
Directive Type Memorandum (DTM) 09-026 - Responsible and Effective Use of Internet-based Capabilities |
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Author: |
William Lynn |
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Title: |
Deputy Secretary of Defense |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
Department of Defense |
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Title: |
DOD Releases Policy for Responsible and Effective Use of Internet-Based Capabilities |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
Public Affairs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense |
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Title: |
US v. Pfc. Manning Court Ruling on defense Article 13 motion |
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Author: |
Denise Lind |
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Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
"United States versus Private First Class Manning, Article 13, Unlawful Pretrial Confinement |
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Archive Link |
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We will raise the level of the officer who is authorized to initiate a fact-finding inquiry or separation proceeding regarding homosexual conduct to a general or flag officer in the service member's chain of command. We will raise the level of the person who is authorized to conduct a fact-finding inquiry to the level of lieutenant colonel, Navy commander or above.
[...]
We will raise the level of the office of officer who is authorized to separate an enlisted member to a general or flag officer in the service member's chain of command.
[...]
We will revise what constitutes credible information to begin an inquiry or separation proceeding by for example specifying that information provided by third parties should be given under oath and by discouraging the use of overheard statements and hearsay. We will revise what constitutes a reliable person, on whose word an inquiry could be initiated, with special scrutiny on third parties who may be motivated to harm the service member.
[...]
Finally certain categories of confidential information will no longer be used in support of discharges including information provided to lawyers, clergy and psychotherapists; information provided to a medical professional, in furtherance of medical treatment, or a public-health official, in the course of a public-health inquiry; information provided in the course of seeking professional assistance, for domestic or physical abuse, and information obtained in the course of security clearance investigations, in accordance with existing Department of Defense policies.
[...]
The services will have 30 days to conform their regulations to these changes. Meanwhile, these modifications will take effect immediately and will apply to all open and future cases. In effect, this means that all separations from this point forward will take place under the revised regulations. |
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Name(s:) |
Robert Gates |
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Title: |
Secretary of Defense |
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Agency(ies): |
Department of Defense |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/j5k60 |
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Title: |
US v. Pfc. Manning Court Ruling on defense Article 13 motion |
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Author: |
Denise Lind |
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Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
"United States versus Private First Class Manning, Article 13, Unlawful Pretrial Confinement |
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Archive Link |
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Title: |
US v. Pfc. Manning Court Ruling on defense Article 13 motion |
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Author: |
Denise Lind |
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Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
"United States versus Private First Class Manning, Article 13, Unlawful Pretrial Confinement |
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Archive Link |
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Q We only have a couple more minutes, but, Secretary Gates, WikiLeaks recently released a video that showed U.S. troops killing some civilians in Iraq. I understand the fog of war, and I understand that this was a very difficult situation. Does the release of that video and the fact that that happened damage the image of the U.S. in the world?
SEC. GATES: I don't think so. They're in a combat situation. The video doesn't show the broader picture of the firing that was going on at American troops. It's obviously a hard thing to see and it's painful to see, especially when you learn after the fact what was going on. But you talked about the fog of war. These people were operating in split-second situations. And, you know, we've investigated it very thoroughly. And it's unfortunate. It's clearly not helpful. But by the same token, I think -- think it should not have any lasting consequences. |
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Name(s:) |
Robert Gates |
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Title: |
Secretary of Defense |
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Agency(ies): |
Department of Defense |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/7Hxes |
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WikiLeaks, a whistle-blowing Web site that publishes anonymous submissions and leaked documents |
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Name(s:) |
John Kruzel |
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Agency(ies): |
American Forces Press Service, Department of Defense |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/VVw2t |
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I think it should not have any lasting consequences. |
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Name(s:) |
Robert Gates |
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Title: |
Secretary of Defense |
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Agency(ies): |
Department of Defense |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/VVw2t |
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Q A quick follow-up to that. The WikiLeaks folks put out, you know, that video last week. There's apparently another video of a(n) Afghanistan incident coming out. Does the -- does the appearance of these videos -- the appearance of these videos coming late reopens these investigations in the public's mind. Is there a case to be made that, when you have a high-profile incident of civilian casualties, that the Defense Department should early on release its own gun-sight videos, bomb videos, this kind of stuff to put more information out about controversial events?
SEC. GATES: Well, I think the challenge that we face is getting all of the information. I mean, these people can put anything out they want and are never held accountable for it. There is no before and there is no after: It's only the present. And, you know, it's like -- it's a little bit like embeds, in the respect that I've always believed embedding was a great idea, in part because it allows journalists to see what our men and women in uniform do every day, to see these situations that they face where they have to make these hard calls. But the reality is, you end up looking at the war through a soda straw. And if the platoon you're with had a good day, then the war's going well, and if they had a bad day, the war's going badly. And that's the problem with these videos, is, you're looking at a situation through a soda straw and you have no context or perspective. And for us to put that together, to try and recreate all of that, is a challenge. And so I just think that, you know, we take these things seriously. I've repeated what I said about General McChrystal's attitude toward it and his very profound belief that the civilian casualties are critical in hampering our efforts in Afghanistan. And we will -- and we investigate every single one of these incidents, not only to determine whether there's accountability or what actually happened, but also to see if there are some lessons to be learned in terms of how to avoid it the next time around. |
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Name(s:) |
Robert Gates |
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Title: |
Secretary of Defense |
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Agency(ies): |
Department of Defense |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/xkRDO |
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Title: |
US v. Pfc. Manning Court Ruling on defense Article 13 motion |
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Author: |
Denise Lind |
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Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
"United States versus Private First Class Manning, Article 13, Unlawful Pretrial Confinement |
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Archive Link |
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Title: |
Pfc. Bradley E. Manning's Statement for the Providence Inquiry |
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Author: |
Bradley Manning |
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Concerning: |
"United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning |
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Title: |
US v. Pfc. Manning Court Ruling on defense Article 13 motion |
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Author: |
Denise Lind |
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Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
"United States versus Private First Class Manning, Article 13, Unlawful Pretrial Confinement |
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Archive Link |
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Title: |
US v. Pfc. Manning Court Ruling on defense Article 13 motion |
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Author: |
Denise Lind |
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Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
"United States versus Private First Class Manning, Article 13, Unlawful Pretrial Confinement |
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Archive Link |
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Title: |
US v. Pfc. Manning Court Ruling on defense Article 13 motion |
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Author: |
Denise Lind |
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Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
"United States versus Private First Class Manning, Article 13, Unlawful Pretrial Confinement |
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Archive Link |
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Title: |
US v. Pfc. Manning Court Ruling on defense Article 13 motion |
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Author: |
Denise Lind |
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Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
"United States versus Private First Class Manning, Article 13, Unlawful Pretrial Confinement |
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Archive Link |
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Title: |
US v. Pfc. Manning Court Ruling on defense Article 13 motion |
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Author: |
Denise Lind |
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Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
"United States versus Private First Class Manning, Article 13, Unlawful Pretrial Confinement |
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Archive Link |
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Title: |
US v. Pfc. Manning Court Ruling on defense Article 13 motion |
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Author: |
Denise Lind |
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Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
"United States versus Private First Class Manning, Article 13, Unlawful Pretrial Confinement |
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Archive Link |
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Title: |
US v. Pfc. Manning Court Ruling on defense Article 13 motion |
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Author: |
Denise Lind |
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Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
"United States versus Private First Class Manning, Article 13, Unlawful Pretrial Confinement |
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Archive Link |
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Title: |
US v. Pfc. Manning Court Ruling on defense Article 13 motion |
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Author: |
Denise Lind |
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Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
"United States versus Private First Class Manning, Article 13, Unlawful Pretrial Confinement |
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Archive Link |
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XXXXXXXXXX He is a psychiatrist that performed a behavioral health evaluation on PFC Manning on 22 May and 28 May 2010. He will testify that XXXXXXXXXX [ Master Sergeant Paul Adkins (now Sergeant First Class due to an administrative action) ] had expressed concern to him about PFC Manning around l0 April 2010, and had given him a memorandum where he documented his concerns. Since PFC Manning's primary clinician, XXXXXXXXXX was on leave at the time, he completed the command directed mental health evaluation. Based on his interview of PFC Manning and review of his records, XXXXXXXXXX will testify,' that he determined PFC Manning was at risk to himself and others and recommended that he not have an operable weapon. He will testify that he considered making a recommendation as to PFC Manning's access to classified information in his 22 May 2010 evaluation but did not do so because he had been informed that PFC Manning was no longer allowed in the T-SCIF. Instead, he deleted the block referencing access to classified information on the MEDCOM Form 4038 in order to have more space to write notes on the form. XXXXXXXXXX will testify that he did receive training on the subject of Soldier suitability for access to classified information. The training that he received was informal 'on-the-job' training during his residency. He will testify that the factors suggested to look for in making suitability determinations were (1) reliability, (2) suitability, and (3) judgment. On his 28 May 2010 mental health evaluation. XXXXXXXXXX will testify that he made a recommendation that PFC Manning was not suitable for continued access to classified material and that his security clearance should be rescinded. |
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Name(s:) |
David Coombs |
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Title: |
civilian defense counsel |
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Concerning: |
United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/LyPts |
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Title: |
US v. Pfc. Manning Court Ruling on defense Article 13 motion |
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Author: |
Denise Lind |
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Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
"United States versus Private First Class Manning, Article 13, Unlawful Pretrial Confinement |
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Archive Link |
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Title: |
US v. Pfc. Manning Court Ruling on defense Article 13 motion |
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Author: |
Denise Lind |
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Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
"United States versus Private First Class Manning, Article 13, Unlawful Pretrial Confinement |
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Archive Link |
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XXXXXXXXXX He is a psychiatrist that performed a behavioral health evaluation on PFC Manning on 22 May and 28 May 2010. He will testify that XXXXXXXXXX [ Master Sergeant Paul Adkins (now Sergeant First Class due to an administrative action) ] had expressed concern to him about PFC Manning around l0 April 2010, and had given him a memorandum where he documented his concerns. Since PFC Manning's primary clinician, XXXXXXXXXX was on leave at the time, he completed the command directed mental health evaluation. Based on his interview of PFC Manning and review of his records, XXXXXXXXXX will testify,' that he determined PFC Manning was at risk to himself and others and recommended that he not have an operable weapon. He will testify that he considered making a recommendation as to PFC Manning's access to classified information in his 22 May 2010 evaluation but did not do so because he had been informed that PFC Manning was no longer allowed in the T-SCIF. Instead, he deleted the block referencing access to classified information on the MEDCOM Form 4038 in order to have more space to write notes on the form. XXXXXXXXXX will testify that he did receive training on the subject of Soldier suitability for access to classified information. The training that he received was informal 'on-the-job' training during his residency. He will testify that the factors suggested to look for in making suitability determinations were (1) reliability, (2) suitability, and (3) judgment. On his 28 May 2010 mental health evaluation. XXXXXXXXXX will testify that he made a recommendation that PFC Manning was not suitable for continued access to classified material and that his security clearance should be rescinded. |
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Name(s:) |
David Coombs |
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Title: |
civilian defense counsel |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/LyPts |
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Title: |
US v. Pfc. Manning Court Ruling on defense Article 13 motion |
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Author: |
Denise Lind |
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Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
"United States versus Private First Class Manning, Article 13, Unlawful Pretrial Confinement |
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Archive Link |
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Title: |
US v. Pfc. Manning Court Ruling on defense Article 13 motion |
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Author: |
Denise Lind |
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Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
"United States versus Private First Class Manning, Article 13, Unlawful Pretrial Confinement |
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Archive Link |
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Title: |
US v. Pfc. Manning Court Ruling on defense Article 13 motion |
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Author: |
Denise Lind |
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Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
"United States versus Private First Class Manning, Article 13, Unlawful Pretrial Confinement |
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Archive Link |
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Title: |
US v. Pfc. Manning Court Ruling on defense Article 13 motion |
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Author: |
Denise Lind |
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Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
"United States versus Private First Class Manning, Article 13, Unlawful Pretrial Confinement |
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Archive Link |
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Leaking of classified information is against the law, cannot be tolerated, and will, when proven, lead to the prosecution of those found to be engaged in such activity. Revealing unclassified, but sensitive, pre-decisional, or otherwise restricted information is also prohibited unless specifically authorized.
Current DoD policy, outlined by Directive 5122.05, 'Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs,' (attached) states that the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs is the sole release authority for official DoD information to news media in Washington, and that all media activities must be coordinated through appropriate public affairs channels. This policy is, all to often ignored. Accordingly, we must enhance our internal coordination mechanisms to ensure that Department officials are aware of the most current departmental and inter-agency information and perspective on the topic at hand when they engage the media. We need to ensure that, as they do so, we avoid misunderstandings and miscommunications caused by insufficient situational awareness.
Accordingly, prior to interviews or any other means of media and public engagement with possible national or international implications, all component leaders or their public affairs officers must notify OSD Public Affairs which, in turn and as appropriate, will ensure that senior Department officials with the relevant overall knowledge and situational awareness have been consulted. |
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Name(s:) |
Robert Gates |
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Title: |
Secretary of Defense |
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Agency(ies): |
Department of Defense |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Title: |
Subject: Interaction with the Media |
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Author: |
Robert Gates |
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Title: |
Secretary of Defense |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
Department of Defense |
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Audience: |
Deputy Secretary of Defense, Secretaries of the Military Departments, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Under Secretaries of Defense, Commanders of the Combatant Commands, Assistant Secretaries of Defense, General Counsel of the Department of Defense, Assistants to the Secretary of Defense Director, Administration and Management |
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QUESTION: To pursue another aspect of the memo and your comments today, which is the unauthorized release of classified information, charges were filed this week against Private Manning in the so-called WikiLeaks case. How significant a breach of national security do you view that? And given that a young soldier is alleged to have had relatively free access to information, was able to download it and take it out of his headquarters, are you ordering any kind of review of security clearance processes, computer security, or any other steps that are necessary?
SEC. GATES: Well, first of all, Thom, I don't know the seriousness of the breach. I'm not familiar with the investigation that took place, and so would basically have to say I defer to the Army in terms of the -- of the specific case. In some respects, what this illustrates is the incredible amount of trust we place in even our most junior men and women in the uniform. And I would be loath to change that because of a few examples, because there are a few bad apples. We have over 2 million men and women in uniform, and I believe we should always err on the side of trusting them because virtually all of them -- not 100 percent, but nearly 100 percent -- give us reasons every single day to continue trusting them. So, no, I haven't ordered a review. If the results of the investigation suggest that might be necessary, then we'll take a look at it at the time. But my instinct is to take these on a case-by-case basis. |
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Name(s:) |
Robert Gates |
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Title: |
Secretary of Defense |
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Agency(ies): |
Department of Defense |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/oXN5a |
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QUESTION: May I also follow up very briefly on the media memo? Because, again, in it you say, sir, any means of media and public engagement -- any means -- with possible national or international implications. That is perhaps, I think, the broadest, by any measure, bounding or restriction: any means of public engagement. Could you explain, do troops and commanders and people in the United States military give up -- I'm quite serious -- their right of free speech, their right to speak freely? Does any public engagement they have, which is what your words say, now have to be screened? Do they -- what rights of free speech does a person in the United States military have?
SEC. GATES: Let me ask the chairman --
ADM. MULLEN: From my perspective, this isn't at all about the First Amendment. It's very much about what the secretary laid out in terms of coordination and synchronization and the discipline. It is not in any way, shape or form meant to preclude the -- the proper engagement with the press. And all of us in the military understand that being in the military, we follow certain guidelines. And this is -- this is to actually, in great part, emphasize guidance that has been out there for an extensive period of time but we've just -- we just walked away from. And so I think in light of what's -- certainly in light of what's happened recently -- but it isn't just the Rolling Stone piece; it was -- would just reaffirm what the secretary said. It's something he and I have been talking about for longer than that, the need to, in fact, ensure that we're coordinated, synchronized, and that -- and that we do tell our story. In my engagement with the military since the Rolling Stone article, it's important that, one, we don't see the press as the enemy, and I've said that; two, that we don't overreact here; and, three, that we do tell our story. And so it's -- and it is a -- it is a challenge today because of the 24-hour news cycle, because of the pace. We understand that -- and that in engaging the press and the media we have to do it from the position in which we're qualified to do that, very specifically.
QUESTION: Admiral Mullen, don't mean to take too much time, but 'any engagement' -- are you in fact saying that a trooper in the field, before he e-mails, has a telephone conversation, posts something on his Facebook page, Twitters, has any public engagement with the media, it must be cleared by this building?
ADM. MULLEN: If I were to use the trooper in the field -- who is very specifically, let's say, with an embed -- I think the rules with respect to that embed should be understood going in, and then just follow those rules very specifically, as an example... |
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Name(s:) |
Mike Mullen |
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Title: |
Chair |
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Agency(ies): |
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/oXN5a |
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Title: |
Subject: Interaction with the Media |
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Author: |
Robert Gates |
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Title: |
Secretary of Defense |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
Department of Defense |
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Audience: |
Deputy Secretary of Defense, Secretaries of the Military Departments, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Under Secretaries of Defense, Commanders of the Combatant Commands, Assistant Secretaries of Defense, General Counsel of the Department of Defense, Assistants to the Secretary of Defense Director, Administration and Management |
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Title: |
Defense Department Media Access policy |
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Author: |
Robert Gates, Mike Mullen |
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Title: |
Secretary of Defense, Chair |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense |
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Title: |
WikiLeaks Publication Afghan War Diary, 2004-2010 |
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Classification: |
Secret, (Below Secret) |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
Central Command, CENTCOM, Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
"WikiLeaks Publication |
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Title: |
WikiLeaks Publication War Diary: Afghanistan War Logs |
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Classification: |
Secret, (Below Secret) |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
Central Command, CENTCOM, Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
"WikiLeaks Publication |
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Title: |
Pentagon Assesses Leaked Documents |
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Author: |
Michael Carden |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
American Forces Press Service, Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
"Afghan War Diary |
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Archive Link |
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We are in the process right now of assessing the documents,' Lapan added.
[...]
The Pentagon has yet to confirm the impact of the reports, as it's still early in the assessment process, Lapan said.
[...]
'As they are made available, we will be looking at them to try to determine potential damage to lives of our servicemembers and our coalition partners; whether they reveal sources in methods and any potential damage to national security,' he said. 'Since this was just released last night, we're still in the process going through that assessment.'
[...]
It could take the Pentagon weeks to make such determinations, Lapan said. But much of what the Pentagon has discovered early in the investigation is that the documents are classified at a 'secret' level, and not 'top-secret,' which is reserved for more sensitive material, he said.
[...]
'There's nothing we've seen so far that is particularly relevant,' Lapan added. |
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Name(s:) |
Dave Lapan |
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Title: |
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Media Operations |
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Agency(ies): |
Department of Defense |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/4GgwU |
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Title: |
Pentagon Assesses Leaked Documents |
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Author: |
Michael Carden |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
American Forces Press Service, Department of Defense |
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Archive Link |
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An investigation has been initiated, [and] Army CID has the lead,' Lapan said.
[...]
'(CID) is an investigative agency that has the ability, the capability, to do these types of things,' Lapan said. 'There are a number of investigative agencies (within the Pentagon), but the decision was made that Army CID takes the lead.'
[...]
Army CID, he said, also is investigating the case of Army Spc. Bradley Manning, who has been charged with leaking a video of a U.S. helicopter attack in Iraq to WikiLeaks. The document leaks investigation is a continuation or extension of the existing open investigation on Manning, Lapan said.
[...]
However, he added, the document leak investigation is 'broader' than the Manning case.
[...]
'The current investigation into the leak of the documents to WikiLeaks isn't focused on any one, specific individual,' Lapan said. 'It's much broader. They're going to look everywhere to determine what the source may be.' |
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Name(s:) |
Dave Lapan |
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Title: |
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Media Operations |
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Agency(ies): |
Department of Defense |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/WUE6Y |
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The answer, Morrell said, is 'to go after the 'bad actors,' hold them responsible, prosecute them to the fullest extent of the law, but don't change the fundamental trusting relationship that makes the military so effective.'
[...]
'We are aligned in that respect,' Morrell said of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. 'But we each have our own interests here that we have to balance and work through. We think we're making a lot of progress there, but we're not alone in the driver's seat.
[...]
'As Secretary Gates says, we're in the passenger seat. They're at the wheel,' Morrell continued. 'They determine the direction and the pace, but we're going to be their partner in this effort.'
[...]
'And are there any things in there that could jeopardize our operations or our nation's security?' he continued. 'We just don't know at this point.' |
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Name(s:) |
Geoff Morrell |
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Title: |
Press Secretary |
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Agency(ies): |
Pentagon, Department of Defense |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/WUE6Y |
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Title: |
Pentagon Launches Probe into Document Leaks |
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Author: |
Michael Carden |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
American Forces Press Service, Department of Defense |
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Archive Link |
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I also urged the House leaders to pass the necessary funding to support our efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan. I know much has been written about this in recent days as a result of the substantial leak of documents from Afghanistan covering a period from 2004 to 2009.
While I'm concerned about the disclosure of sensitive information from the battlefield that could potentially jeopardize individuals or operations, the fact is these documents don't reveal any issues that haven't already informed our public debate on Afghanistan; indeed, they point to the same challenges that led me to conduct an extensive review of our policy last fall.
So let me underscore what I've said many times: For seven years, we failed to implement a strategy adequate to the challenge in this region, the region from which the 9/11 attacks were waged and other attacks against the United States and our friends and allies have been planned.
That's why we've substantially increased our commitment there, insisted upon greater accountability from our partners in Afghanistan and Pakistan, developed a new strategy that can work, and put in place a team, including one of our finest generals, to execute that plan. Now we have to see that strategy through.
And as I told the leaders, I hope the House will act today to join the Senate, which voted unanimously in favor of this funding, to ensure that our troops have the resources they need and that we're able to do what's necessary for our national security. |
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Name(s:) |
Barack Obama |
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Title: |
President of the United States |
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Agency(ies): |
White House |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/I3kTB |
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Title: |
Remarks by the President After Bipartisan Leadership Meeting, Rose Garden |
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Author: |
Barack Obama |
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Title: |
President of the United States |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
White House |
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Concerning: |
"Afghan War Diary |
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Archive Link |
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Title: |
Presidential Remarks on WikiLeaks of Classified Documents |
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Author: |
Barack Obama |
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Title: |
President of the United States |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
White House |
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Concerning: |
"Afghan War Diary |
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Title: |
Obama: Issues in Leaked Documents Led to Review |
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Author: |
Lisa Daniel |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
American Forces Press Service, Department of Defense |
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Archive Link |
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The Pentagon has launched an investigation to find out how thousands of classified military documents were leaked to the group WikiLeaks.org, a Defense Department spokesman said.
[...]
However, he added, the document leak investigation is 'broader' than the Manning case.
[...]
'The current investigation into the leak of the documents to WikiLeaks isn't focused on any one, specific individual,' Lapan said. 'It's much broader. They're going to look everywhere to determine what the source may be.' |
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Name(s:) |
Dave Lapan |
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Title: |
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Media Operations |
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Agency(ies): |
Department of Defense |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/F5A8f |
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Yesterday, I called FBI Director Robert Mueller and asked for the FBI's assistance in our investigation as a partner. It is important that we have all the resources we need to investigate and assess this breach of national security. Furthermore, the department is taking action in theater to prevent a repeat of such a breach, to include tightening procedures for accessing and transporting classified information. |
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Name(s:) |
Robert Gates |
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Title: |
Secretary of Defense |
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Agency(ies): |
Department of Defense |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/nhVsF |
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Title: |
Gates Calls on FBI to Join Leak Investigation |
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Author: |
Jim Garamone |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
American Forces Press Service, Department of Defense |
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Archive Link |
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Q General Campbell, Barbara Starr from CNN. When you look at something like Wikileaks, as a commander, what concerns you about the -- specifically, if you can, about the disclosure of that type of information and the risk that it can pose to troops, operations and Afghan civilians who assist you? And I ask this because so many people are trying to assess is this really a critical leak of information, or is it just a huge volume of relatively low-level material.
GEN. CAMPBELL: Hi, Barbara. Good to see you again.
First off as you know, we've been tied up with this DUSTWUN operation. So I've not really read any of the 92,000-plus documents that have reported to be leaked.
I would just tell you from my perspective though, anytime there's any sort of leak of classified material, it has the potential to harm or put in harm's way the military folks that are working out here every day, to preserve that.
So I have not seen any specific examples of what's in that. I've been tied up with this DUSTWUN operation 24/7. If it does in fact name names of people that have worked with coalition forces, I could see that that would have a detriment down the road.
My read just briefly from looking at a couple articles early this morning is that much of the stuff that has come out there is really not new news. It's between 2004 and I think December 2009. Most of that I think we've heard about.
So I didn't think there was anything staggering or new that we didn't know. There are some issues there about the Pakistan interaction and the tie-in with what's going on over here.
I would just tell you that we're really working hard with our Pakistan counterparts. I have Pakistani LNOs in the JOC here. I've been over to Pakistan since I've been here, to work with the XI Corps and the Frontier Corps.
I think we have a great opportunity here in the next six to nine months, with the leadership that we have on the border of Pakistan and down to the battalion level, to really work that aggressively.
There have been a lot of operations the last year-plus in Pakistan along the border. I think they realize that we face a common foe and we have to work together, to get rid of that common foe, to make sure that we don't have safe havens in Pakistan.
And some -- I think there's some potential to do good stuff. But as far as the Wikileaks, I don't think there's a great impact currently on us here today. And we have not changed any of our operations or any strategy here based on that. |
| |
Name(s:) |
John Campbell |
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Title: |
Commander |
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Agency(ies): |
Regional Command East in Afghanistan, Combined Joint Task Force 101,101st Airborne Division, Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
Afghan War Diary |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/cL0Wr |
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Pentagon spokesman Marine Corps Col. Dave Lapan said today that U.S. troops in Afghanistan are hearing discontent from Afghan partners, whose names were revealed in the documents leak. Some Afghan nationals work with coalition forces to provide information and whereabouts of militants and insurgent activities.
[...]
'There's been displeasure from folks whose names appeared there,' Lapan said. 'Anyone whose name appears in those documents is at risk. It could be a threat to their lives, or to their future conduct' in support of coalition forces. |
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Dave Lapan |
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Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Media Operations |
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Department of Defense |
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Archive Link
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Thank you for your July 28, 2010, letter regarding the unauthorized disclosure and publication of classified military documents by the WikiLeaks organization. |
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Name(s:) |
Robert Gates |
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Title: |
Secretary of Defense |
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Department of Defense |
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SEC. GATES: Good afternoon. I would first like to start with some comments about the release and subsequent publication of classified military documents earlier this week.
First, as the president stated, the problems identified and the issues raised in these documents relating to the war in Afghanistan have been well known in and out of government for some time. In fact, it was the recognition of many of these challenges that led to the president to conduct an extensive review of our Afghan strategy last year, which concluded that our mission there needed a fundamentally new approach.
These documents represent a mountain of raw data and individual impressions, most several years old, devoid of context or analysis. They do not represent official positions or policy. And they do not, in my view, fundamentally call into question the efficacy of our current strategy in Afghanistan and its prospects for success.
Having said all that, the battlefield consequences of the release of these documents are potentially severe and dangerous for our troops, our allies and Afghan partners, and may well damage our relationships and reputation in that key part of the world. Intelligence sources and methods, as well as military tactics, techniques and procedures, will become known to our adversaries.
This department is conducting a thorough, aggressive investigation to determine how this leak occurred, to identify the person or persons responsible, and to assess the content of the information compromised. We have a moral responsibility to do everything possible to mitigate the consequences for our troops and our partners downrange, especially those who have worked with and put their trust in us in the past, who now may be targeted for retribution.
Yesterday, I called FBI Director Robert Mueller and asked for the FBI's assistance in our investigation as a partner. It is important that we have all the resources we need to investigate and assess this breach of national security. Furthermore, the department is taking action in theater to prevent a repeat of such a breach, to include tightening procedures for accessing and transporting classified information.
As a general proposition, we endeavor to push access to sensitive battlefield information down to where it is most useful -- on the front lines -- where as a practical matter there are fewer restrictions and controls than at rear headquarters. In the wake of this incident, it will be a real challenge to strike the right balance between security and providing our frontline troops the information they need.
The U.S. military's success over the years rests on the abilities and integrity of its men and women in uniform and our trust in them. This trust is represented by the fact that, relative to other countries' armed forces, our military culture is one that on the battlefield places great responsibility on the shoulders of even junior servicemembers, to include entrusting them with sensitive information. The American way of war depends upon it.
But to earn and maintain that trust, we must all be responsible in handling, protecting and safeguarding our nation's secrets. For years there has been what I would call appropriate criticism of excessive classification and over-classification of information. However, this recent release of documents is a pointed reminder that much secret information is treated as such to protect sources of information, to protect the lives of our men and women in uniform, to deny our enemies the information about our military operations, and to preserve our relationships with friends and allies.
This recent massive breach should be a reminder to all entrusted with our secrets that there are potentially dramatic and grievously harmful consequences of violations of trust and responsibility. We will aggressively investigate and, wherever possible, prosecute such violations.
Chairman.
[...]
Q Mr. Secretary, do you believe that the investigation should go beyond the source or sources of the leak within the military to include those who received or used the information -- WikiLeaks, the news media? And does the presence of the FBI in the investigation indicate such a widening of its scope?
SEC. GATES: Obviously, in the middle of an investigation, and particularly one that is in the military justice system, there's very little that I can say because of the potential for command influence. My basic position, though, is the investigation should go wherever it needs to go. And one of the reasons that I asked the director of the FBI to partner with us in this is to ensure that it can go wherever it needs to go.
Q To include potentially beyond --
SEC. GATES: I'll just -- I'll just leave it at that.
Julian.
Q Sir, PFC Bradley Manning was charged earlier with another leak to WikiLeaks. Do you feel that there was not -- was there an aggressive enough effort to examine what he accessed that he was not supposed to access? Have you thoroughly looked at what documents he, who's already accused, might have looked at in addition to what he's already been charged with?
SEC. GATES: Well, obviously, what I just said in response to Anne's question goes here, too. I'm just not going to talk about any specific individual or the status of the investigation.
Q If I could try again, then, on a slightly different matter. Is there -- are you -- you mentioned that there would be some changes at the tactical level in Iraq. Are you concerned that -- is it a problem that the rules -- there were insufficient rules in place, or that rules were not followed to the letter that allowed breaches on the front line?
SEC. GATES: Well, again, the -- based on what I've been briefed on and what I knew before, as I said in my statement, if the kind of breach involved in the downloading of these thousands of documents had occurred at a rear headquarters or here in the U.S., very high likelihood we would have detected it.
But the interesting thing is -- and it really was one of the lessons learned from the first Gulf War in 1991 -- was how little useful intelligence information was being received by battalion and company commanders in the field. And so there has been an effort over the last 15 or so years in the military, and I would say really accelerated during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, to push as much information as far forward as possible, which means putting it in a secret channel that almost everybody has access to in uniform, and obviously many civilians as well.
We want those soldiers in a forward operating base to have all the information they possibly can have that impacts on their own security, but also being able to accomplish their mission. And so one of the things that we are going to have to look at with General Petraeus, and soon General Austin, is what kind of -- should we change the way we approach that, or do we -- do we continue to take the risk?
And there are some technological solutions. Most of them are not immediately available to us. But figuring out if we need to change the balance I think is one of the issues that independent of the investigations that all of us are going to have to work on.
[...]
SEC. GATES: I would -- I would just add one other thing. The thing to remember here is that this is a huge amount of raw data, as I said at the outset of my remarks. There is no accountability. There is no sense of responsibility. It is sort of thrown out there for take as you will and damn the consequences.
Q With all due respect, you didn't answer the question.
Q Mr. Secretary, if I could just come back a minute, the fact is, the department -- the U.S. military knew weeks ago; it is part of the public record that tens of thousands of documents had been downloaded. Without referencing any particular legal matter, it has been in the public record released by this department. Charge sheets had been filed. The department, the military knew. So why the surprise? Why didn't the military move faster to assess this, to establish a team to assess it, to bring the FBI in? Charges were filed about tens of thousan |
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Name(s:) |
Robert Gates |
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Title: |
Secretary of Defense |
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Agency(ies): |
Department of Defense |
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Url Link
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Archive Link
http://archive.is/yYDfm |
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ADM. MULLEN: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I certainly share your concerns about the recklessness with which classified documents were both leaked and then posted online.
As I said earlier this week, I am appalled by this behavior, and, frankly, outraged that anyone in their right mind would think it valuable to make public even one sensitive report, let alone tens of thousands of them, about a war that is being waged.
Yes, the documents are old and essentially raw inputs to our intelligence and operations apparatus. And yes, much of what has been revealed has already been commonly understood by the public or otherwise covered in the media. I can assure you, having just come from visits to Afghanistan and Pakistan, that none of what I've seen posted online or reported in the press affects our overarching strategy.
But, frankly, that's not why this is so destructive. The sheer size and scope of the collection now demands a careful review to determine the degree to which future tactical operations may be impacted, and the degree to which the lives of our troops and Afghan partners may be at risk. And I think we always need to be mindful of the unknown potential for damage in any particular document that we handle.
Mr. Assange can say whatever he likes about the greater good he thinks he and his source are doing, but the truth is they might already have on their hands the blood of some young soldier or that of an Afghan family. Disagree with the war all you want, take issue with the policy, challenge me or our ground commanders on the decisions we make to accomplish the mission we've been given, but don't put those who willingly go into harm's way even further in harm's way just to satisfy your need to make a point.
And while I'm at it, let me make one: A big part of my trip -- indeed, a big part of my time as chairman -- has revolved around building and sustaining relationships. Everywhere I went over the last 10 days, those relationships were front and center -- not just for me, but for our commanders and for our diplomats.
I saw it in Kabul, where Ambassador Eikenberry and General Petraeus have forged a strong team and an even stronger dialogue with the Karzai administration.
I saw it in Kandahar city, where I met with a company of U.S. MPs living and working side by side with Afghan police at a security station near the outskirts of town.
I saw it in Islamabad in yet another of my engagements with General Kayani. He spent an entire afternoon flying me to northern Pakistan so I could see for myself some of the rugged terrain he and his troops have to patrol.
If we've learned nothing else in fighting these wars, it's that relationships matter. They are vital. We are not going to kill our way to success, and we sure aren't going to achieve success alone.
So in addition to making sure we understand the tactical risks from these leaks, I think it's incumbent upon us not to let the good relations -- relationships we've established and the trust we've worked so hard to build throughout the region also become a casualty.
Thank you.
[...]
ADM. MULLEN: Let me take this.
SEC. GATES: Yeah, yeah.
ADM. MULLEN: Can I just add -- make one additional comment to that, is in that change, what it has done is it has put -- pushed -- put us in a position to much better match the enemy in terms of speed of war. It's integrated intelligence more rapidly into operations, which then generates more intelligence, which allows us to operate much more effectively. And I think, obviously, as the secretary said, we're going to have to take a look at what this investigation tells us and make sure that we have the balance exactly right.
Q Admiral Mullen, you have mentioned that the founder of WikiLeaks may have blood on his hands. Do you know, have people been killed over this information?
ADM. MULLEN: They're still -- what I am concerned about with this is I think individuals who are not involved in this kind of warfare and expose this kind of information can't -- from my perspective, can't appreciate how this kind of information is routinely networked together inside the classified channels we use specifically.
And it's very difficult, if you don't do this and understand this, to understand the impact, and very specifically the potential that is there -- that is there to risk lives of our soldiers and sailors, airmen and Marines, coalition warfighters, as well -- as well as Afghan citizens. And there's no doubt in my mind about that.
Q What --
[...]
ADM. MULLEN: I think the heart of your question goes to the ISI. And specifically -- and I've said before and would repeat that it's an organization that, actually, we have, in ways, a very positive relationship, very healthy relationship between our intelligence organizations.
And there have been -- that said, there have been elements of the ISI that have got relationships -- a relationship with extremist organizations, and that we -- you know, I, we, consider that unacceptable. In the long run, I think that the ISI has to strategically shift its -- tied in great part to what the secretary's laid out -- focused on its view of its own national-security interests.
These are issues that -- and I have seen some of this; I was just with General Kayani again, and this is a subject we frequently discuss. And they have, as the secretary said, in that country, captured lots of terrorists, killed lots of terrorists, focused on terrorism. And they are strategically shifting.
That doesn't mean that they are through that shift at all, and they do still -- they are still focused on rebuilding this trust as well, and it is not yet rebuilt. |
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Name(s:) |
Mike Mullen |
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Title: |
Chair |
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Agency(ies): |
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/yYDfm |
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Title: |
WikiLeaks Release of Classified War Documents, Jul 29, 2010 |
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Author: |
Robert Gates, Mike Mullen |
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Title: |
Secretary of Defense, Chair |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
"Afghan War Diary |
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Title: |
DOD News Briefing with Secretary Gates and Adm. Mullen from the Pentagon |
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Author: |
Robert Gates, Mike Mullen |
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Title: |
Chair |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
"Afghan War Diary |
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Archive Link |
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Title: |
Gates Calls on FBI to Join Leak Investigation |
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Author: |
Jim Garamone |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
American Forces Press Service, Department of Defense |
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Title: |
Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Mike Mullen, U.S. Navy, conduct a joint press conference in the Pentagon on July 29, 2010. The leak of many thousands of classified documents on the WikiLeaks website was the chief topic under discussion. DoD photo by R. D. Ward. (Released) |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
Department of Defense |
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Audio Press Release |
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Public Affairs, Pentagon, Department of Defense |
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Biden: Pakistani Support for Taliban 'In the Past' |
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Author: |
Lisa Daniel |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
American Forces Press Service, Department of Defense |
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The results of this damage review undercut the testimony of each of the representatives from the OCA for the charge documents in this case. Specifically, the damage assessments concluded that all the information allegedly leaked was either dated, represented low-level opinions, or was commonly understood and known due to previous public disclosures. |
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David Coombs |
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civilian defense counsel |
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XXXXXXXXXX [ROBERT GATES, FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE] will testify that the Afghanistan and Iraq SIGACT releases did not reveal any sensitive intelligence sources or methods. He will also testify that the Department of Defense could not point to anyone in Afghanistan or Iraq harmed due to the documents released by WikiLeaks. He will testify that the Afghanistan and Iraq SIGACTs are simply ground-level field reports that document dated activities which do not disclose sensitive information or our sources and methods. XXXXXXXXXX [ROBERT GATES, FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE] will also testify that the initial public descriptions of the harm to foreign policy due to the publication of diplomatic cables were 'fairly significantly overwrought.' He will also testify that although the disclosures were embarrassing and awkward, they did not represent significant consequences to foreign policy. Finally, XXXXXXXXXX [ROBERT GATES, FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE] will testify that on 29 July 2010, he directed the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to lead a comprehensive review of the documents allegedly given to WikiLeaks and to coordinate under the Information Review Task Force (IRTF, formerly TF 725) to conduct a complete damage review. He will testify that the damage review confirmed that the alleged leaks represented a low to at best moderate risk to national security. Specifically, that all of the information allegedly leaked was either dated, represented low-level opinions, or was already commonly understood and know due to previous public disclosures. |
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Name(s:) |
David Coombs |
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Title: |
civilian defense counsel |
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Url Link
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The Secretary also tasked the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency to stand up an Information Review Task Force to assess, in concert with interagency participants, the substance of the data disclosed. |
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Name(s:) |
Teresa Takai, Thomas Ferguson |
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Title: |
Chief Information Officer, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence |
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Agency(ies): |
Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
Defense Intelligence Agency Information Review Task Force, DIA, IRTF |
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Url Link
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Although outsiders have not been allowed to inspect the 'war room' in suburban Virginia and see its staff at work, national-security officials offered details of the operation to The Daily Beast, including the identity of the counterintelligence expert who has been put in charge: Brig. General Robert A. Carr of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
[...]
Officials say Carr, handpicked for the assignment by Defense Secretary Robert Gates, is highly respected among his colleagues at DIA...
[...]
Carr served in Afghanistan for much of last year before his transfer to the DIA in Washington, where he runs the Defense Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Center. In his battle against Assange, officials say, Carr's central assignment is to try to determine exactly what classified information might have been leaked to WikiLeaks, and then to predict whether its disclosure could endanger American troops in the battlefield, as well as what larger risk it might pose to American foreign policy.
The team has another distinct responsibility: to gather evidence about the workings of WikiLeaks that might someday be used by the Justice Department to prosecute Assange and others on espionage charges.
[...]
Lapan said that, so far, the Pentagon has no evidence to suggest that any Afghan civilians have been harmed by the Taliban as a result of the release of the 76,000 logs this summera bit of good news that, he suggested, might be attributed to the efforts of Carr's team and Central Command to try to protect them. |
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Name(s:) |
Philip Shedon |
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Title: |
Journalist |
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Agency(ies): |
Daily Beast |
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Concerning: |
Defense Intelligence Agency, Information Review Task Force, DIA, IRTF |
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Url Link
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Marine Colonel David Lapan, a senior Pentagon spokesman, said the leaders of the task force believed they had a strong sense of what is contained in the 15,000 documents that Assange is threatening to release shortly.
'We believe we probably know what's in those,' he said. 'And we believe, again, that they will pose some risk to our forces in Afghanistan and to others.'
[...]
'It was their task to go through that initial release of the 76,000 documents and determine what information in each of them might put either livesor sources and methods, or operational securityat risk,' Lapan said of Carr's operation.
The team's assessments, he said, are passed to the United States Central Command, the military command that oversees American troops in Afghanistan, 'so they can get it out to folks in the field to take whatever steps are necessary' to protect American troops and Afghan civilians whose identities are revealed by the logs. |
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Name(s:) |
Dave Lapan |
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Title: |
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Media Operations |
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Agency(ies): |
Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
Defense Intelligence Agency Information Review Task Force, DIA, IRTF |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Title: |
DOD News Briefing with Secretary Gates and Adm. Mullen from the Pentagon (November 30, 2010) |
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Author: |
Public Affairs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
Public Affairs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense |
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Archive Link |
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Title: |
US v. Pfc. Manning Court Ruling on defense Article 13 motion |
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Author: |
Denise Lind |
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Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
"United States versus Private First Class Manning, Article 13, Unlawful Pretrial Confinement |
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It's absolutely false that WikiLeaks contacted the White House and offered to have them look through the documents,' Marine Corps Col. David Lapan said. |
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Name(s:) |
Dave Lapan |
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Title: |
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Media Operations |
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Agency(ies): |
Department of Defense |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/Ekp6s |
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Title: |
Official Rejects Claim WikiLeaks Offered Document Review |
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Author: |
Michael Carden |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
American Forces Press Service, Department of Defense |
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Archive Link |
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My attitude on this is that there are two areas of culpability,' Gates said on ABC's This Week. 'One is legal culpability. And that's up to the Justice Department and others -- that's not my arena.
'But there's also a moral culpability,' he added. 'And that's where I think the verdict is guilty on WikiLeaks. They have put this out without any regard whatsoever for the consequences.' |
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Name(s:) |
Robert Gates |
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Title: |
Secretary of Defense |
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Agency(ies): |
Department of Defense |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/G9F4b |
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The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said he was also angered by the information leak, he said on CBS's Face the Nation. WikiLeaks has blood on their hands, Mullen said, echoing comments he made last week.
Recent statements made by the Taliban endorse the Pentagon's fears, Mullen said. The militant group told British media those Afghans named in the reports for helping U.S. forces will be hunted down.
[...]
'I feel very strongly that the continued release of additional information could continue to jeopardize' lives and impede progress in Afghanistan, Mullen said.
Although Mullen could not offer specifics, the Pentagon is working to protect Afghans named in the leaked reports, he said. |
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Name(s:) |
Mike Mullen |
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Title: |
Chair |
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Agency(ies): |
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/G9F4b |
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AMANPOUR: Secretary Gates, thank you very much for joining us and welcome to 'This Week'.
GATES: Thank you.
AMANPOUR: Let's start with WikiLeaks.
How can an ordinary soldier sitting at his computer, apparently listening to Lady Gaga or whatever, spew all this stuff out with nobody knowing?
GATES: It's -- it's an -- it's an interesting question, because had -- had he tried to do this or had whoever did this tried to do it at a -- a rear headquarters, overseas or in pretty much anywhere here in the U.S., we have controls in place that would have allowed us to detect it. But one of the changes that has happened as we have fought these wars in Iraq and Afghanistan has been an effort to put the -- put as much information and intelligence as far forward to the soldiers as we possibly can, so that at a forward operating base, they -- they know what the security risks are to them and they -- and they also have information to help them accomplish their mission.
So -- so we put an enormous amount of information out at a -- at the secret level and push it the furthest forward possible. And so it is this -- it -- it was much easier to do in theater and in Afghanistan or Iraq than it would have been at a rear headquarters or here in the U.S.
AMANPOUR: So do you now have to reassess that -- much less intelligence going to the forward bases?
GATES: I think we have to look at it, although I must say, my bias is that if one or a few members of the military did this, the notion that we would handicap our soldiers on the front lines by denying them information in an effort to try and prevent this from happening -- my bias is against that. I want those kids out there to have all the information they can have.
And so we're going to look at are there ways in which we can mitigate the risk, but without denying the forward soldiers the information.
AMANPOUR: How angry were you -- beyond the fact that classified information is out there -- the substance of it?
GATES: Well, I'm not sure anger is the right word. I just -- I think mortified, appalled. And -- and if -- if I'm angry, it is -- it is because I believe that this information puts those in Afghanistan who have helped us at risk. It puts our soldiers at risk because they can learn a lot -- our adversaries can learn a lot about our techniques, tactics and procedures from the body of these leaked documents. And so I think that's what puts our soldiers at risk.
And -- and then, as I say, our sources. And, you know, growing up in the intelligence business, protecting your sources is sacrosanct. And -- and there was no sense of responsibility or accountability associated with it.
AMANPOUR: You know, you talk about putting your sources at risk, a Taliban spokesman has told a British news organization that they are, indeed, going to go after any of those names that they find in this treasure trove of documents and they will, as they say, they know how to deal with people.
Are you worried?
I mean Admiral Mullen said that this leak basically has blood on its hands?
GATES: Well, I mean given the Taliban's statement, I think it -- it basically proves the point. And my attitude on this is that there are two -- two areas of culpability. One is legal culpability. And that's up to the Justice Department and others. That's not my arena. But there's also a moral culpability. And that's where I think the verdict is guilty on WikiLeaks. They have put this out without any regard whatsoever for the consequences.
AMANPOUR: So let me ask you about a couple of things that came out. One is the possibility that the Taliban may have Stinger missiles.
Do they, do you think?
GATES: I don't think so.
AMANPOUR: At all?
GATES: I don't think so.
AMANPOUR: The other is about Pakistan. Again raising the notion that Pakistan, no matter how much you say they're, you know, moving in your direction, helping with this fight against the Taliban and against al Qaeda, that they still are hedging their bets, that elements in Pakistan continue to hedge their bets or out and out support the Taliban and what they're doing in Afghanistan.
How much of a problem is that for you?
GATES: Well, it -- it is a concern, there's no question about it. But -- but I would say that, again, we walked out on Pakistan and Afghanistan in 1989 and left them basically holding the bag. And -- and there is always the fear that we will do that again. And I believe that's the reason there's a certain hedge.
But what I see is a change in the strategic calculus in Pakistan. As they see these groups attacking Pakistan itself, where they are more and more partnering with us and working with us and fighting these insurgents and 140,000 soldiers in Northwestern Pakistan fighting some of the same insurgents we are.
AMANPOUR: Right. But they're basically fighting the insurgents that are threatening them. They haven't gone into, for instance, these safe havens which still exist, Northern Waziristan. And General Jones, the national security adviser, has told 'The Washington Post' that these safe havens are a big question mark in terms of our success rate.
So unless they do that, cut off those safe havens, will you succeed in Afghanistan?
GATES: Well, I think we can but --
AMANPOUR: Even if the safe havens --
GATES: -- but we clearly --
AMANPOUR: -- exist?
GATES: -- we clearly would like for them to go after the safe havens. But they have gone after the safe haven -- some of the safe havens, in South Waziristan and Swat and elsewhere, places where, 18 months ago, I wouldn't have believed the Pakistanis would be actively engaged -- and militarily.
And so the Pakistanis going after any of these groups, I believe, overall, helps us in what we're trying to accomplish, both with respect to Afghanistan and with respect to al Qaeda.
AMANPOUR: But given the way the war is going right now and given the fact that the Taliban are very wily and very adaptable enemies and they do have a place where they can go across the border and hide, can you afford to wait for the Pakistanis to -- to move on into Northern Waziristan?
GATES: I think that the -- first of all, we are increasing our cooperation with the Pakistanis in terms of working on both sides of the border, in terms of trying to prevent people from crossing that border. We are increasing our forces in Eastern Afghanistan that will help us do this. So I think that -- I think we're moving in the right direction here.
AMANPOUR: But you don't have an open-ended period of time. The president has clearly said that the summer of 2011 is a period of transition. And many people are interpreting that in all sorts of different ways, as you know.
The Taliban is clearly running out the clock -- it's trying to run out the clock.
Let me put something up that David Kilcullen, the counter-insurgency expert, a former adviser to General Petraeus, said about the timetable.
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
DAVID KILCULLEN: They believe that we had stated a date certain, that we were going to leave in the summer of 2011. And they immediately went out and spoke to the population and said, the Americans are leaving in 18 months, as it was then. What are you doing on the 19th month? Who are you backing? Because we'll still be there and they won't be.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
AMANPOUR: So that question is out there. So many people are arranging their schedules for 2011 -- the summer of 2011.
But my question to you is thi |
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Robert Gates |
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Secretary of Defense |
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Department of Defense |
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Url Link
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Archive Link
http://archive.is/QQmeM |
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MR. MORRELL: Hi, guys, good afternoon. I have a brief opening statement, and then we'll get to questions.
On Monday -- pardon me -- Tuesday, it was reported that WikiLeaks has asked the Department of Defense for help in reviewing approximately 15,000 classified documents that WikiLeaks obtained in an unauthorized and inappropriate manner, before WikiLeaks releases those classified documents to the public.
WikiLeaks has made no such request directly to the Department of Defense. These documents are the property of the U.S. government and contain classified and sensitive information.
The Defense Department demands that WikiLeaks return immediately to the U.S. government all versions of documents obtained directly or indirectly from the Department of Defense databases or records.
WikiLeaks's public disclosure last week of a large number of our documents has already threatened the safety of our troops, our allies and Afghan citizens who are working with us to help bring about peace and stability in that part of the world.
Public disclosure of additional Defense Department classified information can only make the damage worse. The only acceptable course is for WikiLeaks to take steps immediately to return all versions of all of these documents to the U.S. government and permanently delete them from its website, computers and records.
A final note. WikiLeaks's web page constitutes a brazen solicitation to U.S. government officials, including our military, to break the law. WikiLeaks's public assertion that submitting confidential material to WikiLeaks is safe, easy and protected by law is materially false and misleading.
The Department of Defense therefore also demands that WikiLeaks discontinue any solicitation of this type.
[...]
Anne.
Q Two things on that. Do you have any mechanism or authority to compel WikiLeaks to do as you say -- as you are demanding? And do you now consider Private Manning the prime suspect in your -- in the WikiLeaks leak?
MR. MORRELL: To the second part first, I think we have described Private Manning -- who is charged with leaking other classified information to this same organization -- as a person of interest. I know of no update to his status since our initial description of him as such.
With regards to the first part of your question, which gets to, beyond our demand, how do we intend to compel, what I would say there, Anne, is that at this point we are making a demand of them. We are asking them to do the right thing. This is the appropriate course of action, given the damage that has already been done, and we hope they will honor our demands and comply with our demands.
We will cross the next bridge when we come to it. If it requires them compelling to do anything -- if doing the right thing is not good enough for them, then we will figure out what other alternatives we have to compel them to do the right thing. Let me leave it at that.
[...]
Daphne.
Q Well, as far as -- could it be -- could it involve legal action, as the next step?
MR. MORRELL: Well, I don't want to speculate as to what it could involve. Obviously, this is a matter that has gotten the attention not just of this department, but of the entire United States government. As we've talked about before, the secretary of Defense brought the FBI into this investigation very early on. The Department of Justice is also involved in this matter.
So those are two entities which have the authority, the wherewithal, should they choose to approach this through the legal system.
That is not what we -- what I am announcing here. What I am announcing here is a request, a demand of WikiLeaks, the organization, to do the right thing and to not further exacerbate the damage that has been done by them to date and return to us all the information that was illegally passed to them and to expunge it from their website and all their records.
[...]
Yeah, Craig.
Q Has DOD analyzed these 15,000 outstanding records and come to any conclusion on -- of how harmful it might be for them to be released?
MR. MORRELL: Well, obviously these 15,000 documents, which they claim to be withholding as part of a harm-minimization exercise, are not in our possession. We don't know for sure which 1,500 [sic; 15,000] documents they are referring to. We have some ideas and are doing some proactive work, some prophylactic work in the event that the documents we suspect they could be are indeed the documents that they are threatening to post. But that's where I'll leave it now.
[...]
Yeah, Tom.
Q Has there been any further discussion or even decisions on changing or tightening security rules in the field? The secretary has acknowledged it's important to have access to this information at the unit level, but clearly there are challenges and risks as well.
MR. MORRELL: Yeah, I mean, I think he addressed this last week, Tom, when he was asked about it when this first broke. I think fundamentally, as he said to you a few weeks ago, even before this most recent disclosure, he fundamentally still believes that one of the things that makes our military the envy of the world is that we instill an incredible degree of trust and responsibility in our most junior officers and our most junior enlisted, so that this organization is not top-heavy, it's effective from top to bottom.
And I think as troubling as this episode is, and again we don't know who is responsible for leaking this information -- as troubling as it is, I think he does not want to do anything to jeopardize the fundamental goodness of this trusting relationship that has existed for decades in the United States military.
That said, this is a problem. The fact that information like this gets out into the public domain is a serious breach. And we are taking measures internally to reinforce existing rules and guidelines and to make sure that people are aware of those rules and guidelines and are being even more vigilant about enforcing the existing rules and guidelines.
[...]
Yeah, Jeff.
Q You have called on WikiLeaks to do the right thing. By your standards, they haven't done the right thing so far. What makes you think they'll suddenly have a change of heart?
MR. MORRELL: I don't know that we're very confident they'll have a change of heart. They've shown no indication thus far that they appreciate the gravity, the seriousness of the situation they have caused -- the lives they have endangered, the operations they have potentially undermined, the innocent people who have potentially been put in harm's way as a result.
So I don't know that we have a high degree of confidence that this -- that this request, this demand unto itself will prevail upon them.
We certainly are hopeful of that being the case. But you know, I don't know what to expect of this organization. We've heard so many different things from so many different people purporting to represent them, I don't know what's the truth.
You know, they claimed initially to have, you know, reviewed these documents. Then we learn afterwards, they've only looked at 2,000 of them, so they don't really know what's in all of them. They claim to have reached out to -- you know, to the United States government to assist in -- you know, for assistance in harm minimization. Then we find out, no, it was through their partner, The New York Times. I don't know The New York Times would describe themselves as their partner.
There is -- there have been a lot of contradictory and conflicting statements along the way, which certainly cause us to question their motivation, their intent, their credibility.
This is an opportunity, it seems to me, for t |
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Name(s:) |
Geoff Morrell |
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Title: |
Press Secretary |
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Agency(ies): |
Pentagon, Department of Defense |
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Url Link
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Archive Link
http://archive.is/kbmlP |
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DOD News Briefing with Geoff Morrell from the Pentagon |
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Author: |
Geoff Morrell |
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Title: |
Press Secretary |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
Pentagon, Department of Defense |
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Archive Link |
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Title: |
Defense Department Daily Briefing, August 5, 2010 |
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Author: |
Geoff Morrell |
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Title: |
Press Secretary |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
Pentagon, Department of Defense |
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Title: |
Pentagon Demands WikiLeaks Return Stolen Documents |
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Author: |
Elaine Wilson |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
American Forces Press Service, Department of Defense |
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The sailors also wanted the straight talk on the WikiLeaks situation. Gates said the illegal release and posting of classified documents on the website poses 'very serious consequences.' The documents contain the names of many Afghans who have helped the coalition and they contain a huge amount of information showing the tactics, techniques and procedures used by coalition forces.
'We know from intelligence that both the Taliban and al-Qaida have given direction to comb those documents for information, so I think the consequences are potentially very severe,' he said. |
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Name(s:) |
Jim Garamone |
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Agency(ies): |
American Forces Press Service, Department of Defense |
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Url Link
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Archive Link
http://archive.is/YPojM |
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On August 12, 2010, immediately following the first release of documents, the Secretary of Defense commissioned two internal DoD studies. The first study, led by the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)), directed a review of DoD information security policy. The second study, led by the Joint Staff, focused on procedures for handling classified information in forward deployed areas. The Secretary also tasked the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency to stand up an Information Review Task Force to assess, in concert with interagency participants, the substance of the data disclosed.
Results of the two studies revealed a number of findings, including the following:
Forward deployed units maintained an over-reliance on removable electronic storage media.
Roles and responsibilities for detecting and dealing with an insider threat must be better defined.
Processes for reporting security incidents need improvement.
Limited capability currently exists to detect and monitor anomalous behavior on classified computer networks.
Once the studies were concluded and the results reported to the Secretary, the Department began working to address the findings and improve its overall security posture to mitigate the possibility of another similar type of disclosure. Some of this work was already planned or underway. For other findings, like the issue of removable media, new initiatives had to be immediately implemented. |
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Teresa Takai, Thomas Ferguson |
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Chief Information Officer and Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence |
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Department of Defense |
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Url Link
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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DoD) INITIATIVES
On August 12, 2010, Defense Secretary Robert Gates commissioned two reviews to determine what policy, procedural and/or technological shortfalls contributed to the unauthorized disclosure to the Wikileaks website. He specifically directed an assessment to determine if the DoD had appropriately balanced restrictions associated with information security and the need to provide our front-line personnel with the information needed to accomplish their assigned missions.
As a result of these two reviews, a number of findings and recommendations are in the process of being assessed and implemented, including the following:
--Disabling and controlling use of removable storage media on DoD classified networks to prevent download from classified networks.
--Developing procedures to monitor and detect suspicious, unusual or anomalous user behavior (similar to procedures now being implemented by credit card companies to detect and monitor fraud).
--Conducting security oversight inspections in all Combatant Commands.
--Undertaking vulnerability assessments of DoD networks.
--Improving awareness and compliance with information protection procedures. Specific examples being undertaken at the Combatant Command level include:
--Increased 'insider threat' training focusing on awareness of associated activity.
--Multi-discipline training between traditional security, law enforcement and information assurance at all echelons.
--The establishment of 'Insider Threat Working Groups' to address the Wikileaks incident and prevent reoccurrence.
--Component-determined restricted access to the Wikileaks site to prevent further dissemination or downloading of classified information to unclassified DoD networks.
--Restating of policy to all personnel regarding restrictions on downloading to government systems and cautionary advice regarding personal IT systems.
Individual DoD components are taking additional action as relevant and appropriate, ranging from random physical inspections to enabling new security features on networks. Leadership reinforcement of workforce responsibilities and new initiatives to safeguard information are key components of DoD's mitigation efforts. Department-wide, the Pentagon is accelerating its publication of policy issuances related to the information security program as well as focusing increased attention on detecting potential insider threats. |
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White House |
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Url Link
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Archive Link
http://archive.is/WJ4io |
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Title: |
Ms. Teresa Takai, Chief Information Officer and Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration and Mr. Thomas Ferguson, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
Department of Defense |
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Title: |
FACT SHEET: U.S. Government Mitigation Efforts in Light of the Recent Unlawful Disclosure of Classified Information |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
Office of the Press Secretary, White House |
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Archive Link |
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Here is the text of the letter, dated Aug. 16 and signed by General Counsel Jeh C. Johnson. Words that were underlined in the original are presented here in all capital letters:
Dear Mr. Matusheski
I understand that you represent yourself to be an attorney for WikiLeaks and that you, on behalf of that organization, sought a conversation with someone in the United States Government to discuss 'harm minimization' with respect to some 15,000 U.S. Government classified documents that WikiLeaks is holding and is threatening to make public. In response, I was prepared to speak with you yesterday at 10:00am EDT and convey the position of the Department of Defense. Despite your agreement to be available by telephone yesterday morning, we could not reach you at that time.
The position of the Department of Defense is clear, and it should be conveyed to your client in no uncertain terms:
WikiLeaks is holding the property of the U.S. Government, including classified documents and sensitive national security information that has not been authorized for release. Further, it is the view of the Department of Defense that WikiLeaks obtained this material in circumstances that constitute a violation of United States law, and that as long as WikiLeaks holds this material, the violation of the law is ongoing.
The Secretary of Defense has made clear the damage to our national security by the public release by WikiLeaks of some 76,000 classified documents several weeks ago, and the threat to the lives of coalition forces in Afghanistan and to the lives of local Afghan nationals as a result. As the Secretary has also stated, we know from various sources that our enemy is accessing the WikiLeaks website for the purpose of exploiting WikiLeaks' illegal and irresponsible actions, to pursue their own terrorist aims.
The threatened release of additional classified documents by WikiLeaks will add to the damage. Among other sensitive items, we believe the classified documents contain, like the first batch of released documents, the names of Afghan nationals who are assisting coalition forces in our efforts to bring about peace and stability in that portion of the world.
Thus, the Department of Defense will NOT negotiate some 'minimized' or 'sanitized' version of a release by WikiLeaks of additional U.S. Government classified documents. The Department demands that NOTHING further be released by WikiLeaks, that ALL of the U.S. Government classified documents that WikiLeaks has obtained be returned immediately, and that WikiLeaks remove and destroy all of these records from its databases.
(Signed)
Jeh Charles Johnson |
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Name(s:) |
Jeh Johnson |
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Title: |
General Counsel |
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Agency(ies): |
Department of Defense |
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Url Link
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Archive Link
http://archive.is/IpLJW |
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After consulting with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, I have directed a thorough investigation to determine the scope of any unauthorized release of classified information and identify the person or persons responsible. I have also established an interagency Information Review Task Force, led by the Defense Intelligence Agency, to assess the content of any compromised information and the impact of such a compromise. Our initial review indicates most of the information contained in these documents relates to tactical military operations. The initial assessment in no way discounts the risk to national security; however, the review to date has not revealed any sensitive intelligence source and methods comprised by this disclosure.
The documents do contain the names of cooperative Afghan national and the Department takes very seriously the Taliban threats recently discussed in the press. We access the risk as likely to cause significant harm or damage to the national security interest of the United States and are examining mitigation options. We are working closely with our allies to determine what risks out mission partners may face as a result of the disclosure. There is a possibility that additional military documents may be published by WikiLeaks and the Department is developing courses of action to address this possibility.
The scope of the assessment and nature of the investigative process requires a great deal of time and effort. I am committed to investigating this matter and determining appropriate action to reduce the risk of any such compromises in the future. We will keep you informed as additional information becomes available. |
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Name(s:) |
Robert Gates |
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Title: |
Secretary of Defense |
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Agency(ies): |
Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
Defense Intelligence Agency, DIA, Information Review Task Force, IRTF |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Author: |
Robert Gates |
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Title: |
Secretary of Defense |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
Department of Defense |
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Audience: |
United States Senator Carl Levin |
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WASHINGTON, Aug. 18, 2010 Defense Department officials today released a letter the Pentagon's top lawyer sent to a man purported to be an attorney for the WikiLeaks website, which published tens of thousands of classified documents last month and is threatening to release 15,000 more.
Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman told reporters this afternoon that Timothy J. Matusheski was a 'no show' for a telephone call that was arranged last week when his name and purported status as a WikiLeaks attorney came up in an investigation of the document leak.
The following day, Whitman said, the Pentagon's general counsel codified the Defense Department's position in a letter and sent it to Matusheski.
Here is the text of the letter, dated Aug. 16 [2010] and signed by General Counsel Jeh C. Johnson. Words that were underlined in the original are presented here in all capital letters:
Dear Mr. Matusheski
I understand that you represent yourself to be an attorney for WikiLeaks and that you, on behalf of that organization, sought a conversation with someone in the United States Government to discuss 'harm minimization' with respect to some 15,000 U.S. Government classified documents that WikiLeaks is holding and is threatening to make public. In response, I was prepared to speak with you yesterday at 10:00am EDT and convey the position of the Department of Defense. Despite your agreement to be available by telephone yesterday morning, we could not reach you at that time.
The position of the Department of Defense is clear, and it should be conveyed to your client in no uncertain terms:
WikiLeaks is holding the property of the U.S. Government, including classified documents and sensitive national security information that has not been authorized for release. Further, it is the view of the Department of Defense that WikiLeaks obtained this material in circumstances that constitute a violation of United States law, and that as long as WikiLeaks holds this material, the violation of the law is ongoing.
The Secretary of Defense has made clear the damage to our national security by the public release by WikiLeaks of some 76,000 classified documents several weeks ago, and the threat to the lives of coalition forces in Afghanistan and to the lives of local Afghan nationals as a result. As the Secretary has also stated, we know from various sources that our enemy is accessing the WikiLeaks website for the purpose of exploiting WikiLeaks' illegal and irresponsible actions, to pursue their own terrorist aims.
The threatened release of additional classified documents by WikiLeaks will add to the damage. Among other sensitive items, we believe the classified documents contain, like the first batch of released documents, the names of Afghan nationals who are assisting coalition forces in our efforts to bring about peace and stability in that portion of the world.
Thus, the Department of Defense will NOT negotiate some 'minimized' or 'sanitized' version of a release by WikiLeaks of additional U.S. Government classified documents. The Department demands that NOTHING further be released by WikiLeaks, that ALL of the U.S. Government classified documents that WikiLeaks has obtained be returned immediately, and that WikiLeaks remove and destroy all of these records from its databases.
(Signed)
Jeh Charles Johnson |
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Agency(ies): |
American Forces Press Service, Department of Defense |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/IpLJW |
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Title: |
Defense.gov Names Top Stories of 2010 |
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Author: |
Jennifer Cragg |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
Emerging Media, Defense Media Activity |
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Notes: |
The Department of Defense links to this press release again on December 21, 2010 in a press release titled, 'Defense.gov Names Top Stories of 2010' |
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Q Why did you decide to speak with Bob Woodward?
SEC. GATES: Well, I think I was probably the last person he spoke to. I think I was the last person he spoke to with the previous book, at the end of the Bush administration, and I think I timed it to the point where the book was already in galleys at that point.
I think that he had some specific questions about overall issues and about the strategy. We didn't get into any specifics about issues or anything like that. And I had his questions in advance, and they were sort of at the 40,000-foot level, about tone and atmosphere and the role of the president in this process. These were issues I'd spoken to publicly, and so I felt comfortable responding.
Q How do feel about the fact that classified transcripts from Situation Room briefings were shared with him? How is it really different from a WikiLeaks publication?
SEC. GATES: Well, I can't say, because I haven't read the book. And so I don't know about that. I guess I would -- I would just -- since I figured I'd -- we'd get a question on this book, there are -- there are actually three points I'd like to make.
The first is, conflict sells. The second, the relationship among senior officials in this administration is as harmonious as any I've experienced in my time in government.
And the third is -- and I believe this very strongly -- presidents are always well served when there is a vigorous and spirited debate over important issues. And I felt that the debate with respect to Afghanistan was instructive. I learned things in the course of that debate.
My positions changed, or were adjusted, or I adjusted them at various points. So I thought it was a constructive process.
Q Mr. Secretary, but, you know, American public support for the war in Afghanistan is already waning. And for them to see the kind of what appears to be divisiveness and backbiting and backstabbing in a way this policy was eventually arrived at, how can you expect the American people to have confidence, not only in the strategy but in American leadership to carry it out?
SEC. GATES: Well, I said that there was a spirited debate. People were often passionate about their views. But I will tell you that once the president made his decision, this team came together and has been working together to execute this strategy. And that was last December.
Q Do you expect another spirited debate at the review in December? I mean, it seems like many of these issues, the fundamental issues of the strategy, aren't settled. People may be behind it now, but when the next review happens, will we have a fundamental debate on the principles of how to go forward? What's December going to look like in that regard?
SEC. GATES: Well, I think just based on the things that I've heard people say, I think the evaluation that we will have in December will be, how are we doing, are we on the right path, do we need to make any adjustments to the basic strategy? I have not gotten the sense from my conversations with people that any basic decisions or basic -- basic changes are likely to occur.
I suspect that we will find some areas where we can make some adjustments and tweaks to try and enhance what's going on now. The fact is we've now got triple the number of civilians as when the president made his decision.
We've got another 30-plus-thousand -- 30,000 American troops, pretty much all in now. All of the -- as the chairman said earlier, all the inputs are there now. And now it's just a matter of executing, both on the civilian and the -- and the military side. I don't know if you want to add anything.
ADM. MULLEN: No, sir, I think -- I think you have it exactly right. I think there certainly could be some adjustments, but we think the strategy's sound. Things that we've -- a lot of things we talked about last year have changed fairly dramatically. And one of the keys has been the development of the security forces, for instance.
So it, I think, looks to how it has been implemented, you know, how we're doing against that strategy and what adjustments we will need to make, if any.
Q If I could follow up with one specific, the Woodward book makes the allegation that the two of you were upset with Lieutenant General Lute that his position that he took during the review last year was not helpful. Was that accurate? Is that book accurate in that regard? Did you make that -- did you say that to Lute?
ADM. MULLEN: (Inaudible) -- well, the secretary's already said it: He hasn't read the book; I haven't read the book either.
Q But in terms of that accusation, which seems -- (it's been blowing up ?) --
SEC. GATES: Not going there.
ADM. MULLEN: Yeah.
Q Mr. Secretary, in general terms, are books like this helpful in that they expose, you know, what we like to think of as smart people wrestling with hard questions? Or would you prefer to be operating in the dark -- (off mike)? (Laughter.)
SEC. GATES: I think the safest answer to that is no comment. (Chuckles.) |
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Name(s:) |
Robert Gates |
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Title: |
Secretary of Defense |
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Agency(ies): |
Department of Defense |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/9L998 |
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Title: |
Defense Department Briefing, Sep 23, 2010 |
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Author: |
Robert Gates |
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Title: |
Secretary of Defense |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
Department of Defense |
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Pentagon spokesman Marine Corps Col. Dave Lapan said the department does not know for sure what Wikileaks will publish, but officials expect the same type of documents the organization put on the Internet in July about the Afghan conflict.
[...]
The potential breach is dangerous, but not fatal, Lapan said, noting neither the Iraq, nor Afghanistan data bases contain intelligence sources and methods. |
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Name(s:) |
Dave Lapan |
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Title: |
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Media Operations |
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Agency(ies): |
Department of Defense |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/b8rMM |
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That said, the period covered by these reports has been well-chronicled in news stories, books and films and the release of these field reports does not bring new understanding to Iraq's past,' Morrell added. |
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Name(s:) |
Geoff Morrell |
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Title: |
Press Secretary |
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Agency(ies): |
Pentagon, Department of Defense |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/b8rMM |
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A DOD task force has been combing through the Iraq data base to assess the damage that a proposed WikiLeaks publication of 400,000 significant activity reports could pose to the U.S. military, Iraqi allies, and on-going operations. |
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Name(s:) |
Jim Garamone |
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Agency(ies): |
American Forces Press Service, Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
Defense Intelligence Agency Information Review Task Force, DIA, IRTF |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/b8rMM |
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Despite WikiLeaks' attempt to redact the names of Iraqi informants from its recent leak of classified military reports, some of those people are still in danger, a Pentagon spokesman said today.
[...]
'We had identified 300 or so people whose names were [mentioned in the documents] that possibly would be put at risk if their names were published,' Pentagon spokesman Marine Corps Col. Dave Lapan said.
[...]
Of that group, he added, the names were removed but 'in a few dozen cases there's still information that could identify those people.'
[...]
Such remaining information includes job titles, he said.
[...]
The U.S. Central Command has the names of those potentially at risk and 'is deciding whether they're going to make notifications or not,' Lapan said.
[...]
A joint task force led by the Defense Intelligence Agency is comparing the original with redacted documents, he said, to assess the damage that WikiLeaks' publication of the classified Iraq significant-activities reports, called the SIGACTS data base, could pose to the U.S. military, Iraqi allies and current operations. |
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Name(s:) |
Dave Lapan |
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Title: |
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Media Operations |
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Agency(ies): |
Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
Iraq War Logs |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/8HJGl |
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COL. DAVID LAPAN (deputy assistant secretary of defense for media operations): Good morning here at the Pentagon, and good evening in Afghanistan. I'd like to welcome to the Pentagon Briefing Room Brigadier General Joseph Osterman, the commanding general of Task Force Leatherneck and the First Marine Division Forward.
As part of Regional Command Southwest, Task Force Leatherneck is comprised of approximately 10,700 personnel, and is responsible for all U.S. Marine ground forces and the Georgian 32nd Infantry Battalion in Helmand province.
General Osterman assumed his duties in Afghanistan in March. This is his first time joining us in this format. He joins us today from his headquarters at Camp Leatherneck in the central Helmand province to provide an update on current operations. General Osterman will make some opening comments, and then he will take your questions. |
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Name(s:) |
Dave Lapan |
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Title: |
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Media Operations |
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Agency(ies): |
Department of Defense |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/8o0BZ |
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Q General, it's Al Pessin from VOA again.
I wanted to ask you about two things that have been in the news in the last week or so. One is the court rulings on 'don't ask, don't tell' that invalidated and then reinstated the policy. Was that noticed out at the FOBs and COPs in your region? And if so, did it create any disruption or any confusion?
And then, the other is the WikiLeaks documents that talked about U.S. forces in Iraq perhaps not doing enough to stop prisoner abuse by Iraqi forces. I want to know if you have any concerns about how Afghan forces treat their prisoners. And what are your orders to your Marines if they become aware of any abuses?
GEN. OSTERMAN: Okay. Well, I'll start with the 'don't ask, don't tell.' The -- really, here down on the ground level here in Afghanistan, there is no impact at all. I think it's safe to say that most of the Marines and sailors of all -- Marines, sailors, soldiers and airmen that I have underneath my charge really are not that aware of a lot of the dialogue that's going on. You've got to remember that most of my Marines are living in 15-man patrol bases where they're lucky to have some running -- some fresh water, you know, in terms of a pump, or some kind of shelter over their head beyond a tent. So as a result, they are not that -- I would say there's not that much information that's coming down to them.
And I also don't know that they necessarily would take it as problematic in terms of the dialogue. They understand that, as Marines, we'll follow the -- whatever laws are in place, and also whatever policies are promulgated by the Secretary of Defense. So really, basically, we'll follow, you know, whatever policy is promulgated there and move on.
As far as the WikiLeaks, that really has had no impact at all on us. Frankly, I personally just read about it in the news, but have not, you know, even visited the website or anything like that. So I'd say it's no impact from that.
And getting to the prisoner situation, that -- we closely monitor the taking of detainees. We don't maintain any long-term detainees here within the field forces. They're allowed to keep them for 96 hours, and then we move -- if they need to be detained beyond that point, we'll move them up to a regulated detention facility that has longer-term capability, that are run by coalition forces.
We do -- because we're closely aligned with our Afghan partners, we do have visibility of the detainees that they take as well. There have been very minor instances where we didn't feel as though they were treating the prisoners correctly. And the Marines have orders to intervene, frankly, and stop that immediately. And once they stop that, they then try to educate the -- whether it be a police officer or an Afghan soldier, educate them on the proper way to conduct detainee operations. And that seems to have worked very well. Most of them, frankly, don't understand all of the rules and regulations associated with that, so the Marines end up providing the mentorship to them, just like they do for combat operations or for patrolling or anything else. We just view that as part of our responsibility to create them as a respected and viable force within the community. |
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Joseph Osterman |
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Commanding General |
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Task Force Leatherneck, First Marine Division Forward, Department of Defense |
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Lynn told reporters here that the 400,000 documents posted on the Web are stolen material.
[...]
'We don't think it should have been released,' he said. 'We're disturbed about the implication, particularly with the volume of it in that it gives insight to potential adversaries to how we operate, how we interact.'
[...]
'Indeed,' he continued, 'there are groups out there who say they are mining this data to use against us. We think it's problematic in that sense.'
[...]
The Internet is much more mature today, he said, noting 'the idea [now] is to get as much of the relevant intelligence out to the field as possible. We tried to change the process so the intelligence is available to warfighters, when they need it. We don't want to change that. It's an important element in the success we've had.' |
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William Lynn |
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Deputy Secretary of Defense |
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Department of Defense |
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We anticipate the release of what are claimed to be several hundred thousand classified State department cables on Sunday night that detail private diplomatic discussions with foreign governments. By its very nature, field reporting to Washington is candid and often incomplete information. It is not an expression of policy, nor does it always shape final policy decisions. Nevertheless, these cables could compromise private discussions with foreign governments and opposition leaders, and when the substance of private conversations is printed on the front pages of newspapers across the world, it can deeply impact not only US foreign policy interests, but those of our allies and friends around the world. To be clear -- such disclosures put at risk our diplomats, intelligence professionals, and people around the world who come to the United States for assistance in promoting democracy and open government. These documents also may include named individuals who in many cases live and work under oppressive regimes and who are trying to create more open and free societies. President Obama supports responsible, accountable, and open government at home and around the world, but this reckless and dangerous action runs counter to that goal. By releasing stolen and classified documents, Wikileaks has put at risk not only the cause of human rights but also the lives and work of these individuals. We condemn in the strongest terms the unauthorized disclosure of classified documents and sensitive national security information. |
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Officials Condemn Leaks, Detail Prevention Efforts |
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Jim Garamone |
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American Forces Press Service, Department of Defense |
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SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, good afternoon. Do we have enough room in here? I want to take a moment to discuss the recent news reports of classified documents that were illegally provided from United States Government computers. In my conversations with counterparts from around the world over the past few days, and in my meeting earlier today with Foreign Minister Davutoglu of Turkey, I have had very productive discussions on this issue.
The United States strongly condemns the illegal disclosure of classified information. It puts people's lives in danger, threatens our national security, and undermines our efforts to work with other countries to solve shared problems. This Administration is advancing a robust foreign policy that is focused on advancing America's national interests and leading the world in solving the most complex challenges of our time, from fixing the global economy, to thwarting international terrorism, to stopping the spread of catastrophic weapons, to advancing human rights and universal values. In every country and in every region of the world, we are working with partners to pursue these aims.
So let's be clear: this disclosure is not just an attack on America's foreign policy interests. It is an attack on the international community the alliances and partnerships, the conversations and negotiations, that safeguard global security and advance economic prosperity.
I am confident that the partnerships that the Obama Administration has worked so hard to build will withstand this challenge. The President and I have made these partnerships a priority and we are proud of the progress that they have helped achieve and they will remain at the center of our efforts.
I will not comment on or confirm what are alleged to be stolen State Department cables. But I can say that the United States deeply regrets the disclosure of any information that was intended to be confidential, including private discussions between counterparts or our diplomats' personal assessments and observations. I want to make clear that our official foreign policy is not set through these messages, but here in Washington. Our policy is a matter of public record, as reflected in our statements and our actions around the world.
I would also add that to the American people and to our friends and partners, I want you to know that we are taking aggressive steps to hold responsible those who stole this information. I have directed that specific actions be taken at the State Department, in addition to new security safeguards at the Department of Defense and elsewhere to protect State Department information so that this kind of breach cannot and does not ever happen again.
Relations between governments aren't the only concern created by the publication of this material. U.S. diplomats meet with local human rights workers, journalists, religious leaders, and others outside of governments who offer their own candid insights. These conversations also depend on trust and confidence. For example, if an anti-corruption activist shares information about official misconduct, or a social worker passes along documentation of sexual violence, revealing that person's identity could have serious repercussions: imprisonment, torture, even death.
So whatever are the motives in disseminating these documents, it is clear that releasing them poses real risks to real people, and often to the very people who have dedicated their own lives to protecting others.
Now, I am aware that some may mistakenly applaud those responsible, so I want to set the record straight: There is nothing laudable about endangering innocent people, and there is nothing brave about sabotaging the peaceful relations between nations on which our common security depends.
There have been examples in history in which official conduct has been made public in the name of exposing wrongdoings or misdeeds. This is not one of those cases. In contrast, what is being put on display in this cache of documents is the fact that American diplomats are doing the work we expect them to do. They are helping identify and prevent conflicts before they start. They are working hard every day to solve serious practical problems to secure dangerous materials, to fight international crime, to assist human rights defenders, to restore our alliances, to ensure global economic stability. This is the role that America plays in the world. This is the role our diplomats play in serving America. And it should make every one of us proud.
The work of our diplomats doesn't just benefit Americans, but also billions of others around the globe. In addition to endangering particular individuals, disclosures like these tear at the fabric of the proper function of responsible government.
People of good faith understand the need for sensitive diplomatic communications, both to protect the national interest and the global common interest. Every country, including the United States, must be able to have candid conversations about the people and nations with whom they deal. And every country, including the United States, must be able to have honest, private dialogue with other countries about issues of common concern. I know that diplomats around the world share this view but this is not unique to diplomacy. In almost every profession whether it's law or journalism, finance or medicine or academia or running a small business people rely on confidential communications to do their jobs. We count on the space of trust that confidentiality provides. When someone breaches that trust, we are all worse off for it. And so despite some of the rhetoric we've heard these past few days, confidential communications do not run counter to the public interest. They are fundamental to our ability to serve the public interest.
In America, we welcome genuine debates about pressing questions of public policy. We have elections about them. That is one of the greatest strengths of our democracy. It is part of who we are and it is a priority for this Administration. But stealing confidential documents and then releasing them without regard for the consequences does not serve the public good, and it is not the way to engage in a healthy debate.
In the past few days, I have spoken with many of my counterparts around the world, and we have all agreed that we will continue to focus on the issues and tasks at hand. In that spirit, President Obama and I remain committed to productive cooperation with our partners as we seek to build a better, more prosperous world for all.
Thank you, and I'd be glad to take a few questions.
MR. CROWLEY: We'll begin with Charlie Wolfson of CBS in his last week here covering the State Department.
SECRETARY CLINTON: Where are you going, Charlie?
QUESTION: I'll (inaudible) into the sunset, but let me get to a question.
SECRETARY CLINTON: Yes, sir. (Laughter.)
QUESTION: Madam Secretary, are you embarrassed by these leaks personally, professionally? And what harm have the leaks done to the U.S. so far that you can determine from talking to your colleagues?
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, Charlie, as I said in my statement, and based on the many conversations that I've had with my counterparts, I am confident that the partnerships and relationships that we have built in this Administration will withstand this challenge. The President and I have made these partnerships a priority, a real centerpiece of our foreign policy, and we're proud of the progress that we have made over the last 22 months.
Every single day, U.S. Government representatives from the entire government, not just from the State Department, engage with hundreds if not thousands of government representatives and members of civil society from around the world. They carry out the goals and the interests and the values of the United States. And it is imperative that we have candid reporting from those who are in the field working with their counterparts in order to inform our decision-making back here in Washington.
I can tell you that in my conversations, at least one of my counterparts said to me, 'Well, don't worry about it. You should see what we say about you.' (Laughter.) So I think that t |
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Hillary Clinton |
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Secretary of State |
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Department of State |
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State Department Briefing, Nov 29, 2010 |
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Hillary Clinton |
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Secretary of State |
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Department of State |
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"Cablegate |
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Clinton: WikiLeaks' Release Attacks International Community |
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Jim Garamone, Lisa Daniel |
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American Forces Press Service, Department of Defense |
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Q: WikiLeaks. Post-WikiLeaks reaction. What's your sense on whether the information-sharing climate and environment created after 9/11 to encourage greater cooperation and transparency among the intelligence communities and the military led to these three massive data dumps?
And how concerned are you now there may be an overreaction to clamp down on information dispersal because of the disclosures?
SEC. GATES: One of the common themes that I heard from the time I was a senior agency official in the early 1980s in every military engagement we were in was the complaint of the lack of adequate intelligence support. That began to change with the Gulf War in 1991, but it really has changed dramatically after 9/11.
And clearly the finding that the lack of sharing of information had prevented people from, quote/unquote, 'connecting the dots' led to much wider sharing of information, and I would say especially wider sharing of information at the front, so that no one at the front was denied -- in one of the theaters, Afghanistan or Iraq -- was denied any information that might possibly be helpful to them. Now, obviously, that aperture went too wide. There's no reason for a young officer at a forward operating post in Afghanistan to get cables having to do with the START negotiations. And so we've taken a number of mitigating steps in the department. I directed a number of these things to be undertaken in August.
First, the -- an automated capability to monitor workstations for security purposes. We've got about 60 percent of this done, mostly in -- mostly stateside. And I've directed that we accelerate the completion of it.
Second, as I think you know, we've taken steps in CENTCOM in September and now everywhere to direct that all CD and DVD write capability off the network be disabled. We have -- we have done some other things in terms of two-man policies -- wherever you can move information from a classified system to an unclassified system, to have a two-person policy there.
And then we have some longer-term efforts under way in which we can -- and, first of all, in which we can identify anomalies, sort of like credit card companies do in the use of computer; and then finally, efforts to actually tailor access depending on roles.
But let me say -- let me address the latter part of your question. This is obviously a massive dump of information. First of all, I would say unlike the Pentagon Papers, one of the things that is important, I think, in all of these releases, whether it's Afghanistan, Iraq or the releases this week, is the lack of any significant difference between what the U.S. government says publicly and what these things show privately, whereas the Pentagon Papers showed that many in the government were not only lying to the American people, they were lying to themselves.
But let me -- let me just offer some perspective as somebody who's been at this a long time. Every other government in the world knows the United States government leaks like a sieve, and it has for a long time. And I dragged this up the other day when I was looking at some of these prospective releases. And this is a quote from John Adams: 'How can a government go on, publishing all of their negotiations with foreign nations, I know not.'
To me, it appears as dangerous and pernicious as it is novel.'
When we went to real congressional oversight of intelligence in the mid-'70s, there was a broad view that no other foreign intelligence service would ever share information with us again if we were going to share it all with the Congress. Those fears all proved unfounded.
Now, I've heard the impact of these releases on our foreign policy described as a meltdown, as a game-changer, and so on. I think -- I think those descriptions are fairly significantly overwrought. The fact is, governments deal with the United States because it's in their interest, not because they like us, not because they trust us, and not because they believe we can keep secrets. Many governments -- some governments deal with us because they fear us, some because they respect us, most because they need us. We are still essentially, as has been said before, the indispensable nation.
So other nations will continue to deal with us. They will continue to work with us. We will continue to share sensitive information with one another.
Is this embarrassing? Yes. Is it awkward? Yes. Consequences for U.S. foreign policy? I think fairly modest.
Q: And on that same subject. On that same subject. Did either of you reach out to any of your counterparts in advance of this leak and warn them, or even apologize in advance for what might come out?
SEC. GATES: I didn't.
ADM. MULLEN: I did.
Q: Who was it?
ADM. MULLEN: To General Kayani in Pakistan. |
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Secretary of Defense |
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Q: And on that same subject. On that same subject. Did either of you reach out to any of your counterparts in advance of this leak and warn them, or even apologize in advance for what might come out?
SEC. GATES: I didn't.
ADM. MULLEN: I did.
Q: Who was it?
ADM. MULLEN: To General Kayani in Pakistan. |
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Mike Mullen |
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Chair |
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Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense |
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Archive Link
http://archive.is/fSBM6 |
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Title: |
Report on Don't Ask, Don't Tell Policy, Nov 30, 2010 |
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Author: |
Robert Gates, Mike Mullen |
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Secretary of Defense, Chair |
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Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense |
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Audio Press Release |
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Public Affairs, Pentagon, Department of Defense |
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Q: Any response to the arrest of the founder of Wikileaks Julian Assange?
SEC. GATES: I hadn't heard that, but that sounds like good news to me.
STAFF: Thanks, guys.
Q: Thanks. |
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Robert Gates |
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Secretary of Defense |
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Department of Defense |
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Gates: Assange Arrest 'sounds Good to Me' |
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Associated Press, AP |
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"Sweden versus Assange |
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Q: Thank you. Yes, President Karzai has been described in a trove of secret diplomatic American cables as erratic, problematic; and by -- and described by the American ambassador as not a reliable ally. Are those assessments incorrect? And how embarrassing is this for the United States?
SECRETARY GATES: Well, I would say that the WikiLeaks and -- leak -- revelation of all of these documents is extraordinarily embarrassing for the United States. But at the end of the day, nations make -- and leaders make decisions based on their interests. And I would say that America's best partners and friends -- and I include among them President Karzai -- have responded to this, in my view, in an extraordinarily statesmanlike way. And I'm deeply grateful. And frankly, I think the American government will not forget this kind of statesmanlike response.
I think I also could say, with great confidence, President Karzai and I have been meeting together privately now for four years, and I don't think either of us would be embarrassed to have a single thing we have said to each other made public.
So this relationship will go on, because it's in our interests, and we have a shared vision for this country.
[...]
Q As Secretary Gates indicated, U.S. and Afghan officials have both said that the training of Afghan security forces over the past year has gone better than projected. Does this mean that the government of Afghanistan could possibly take primary responsibility for its security before the end of 2014?
And President Karzai, could you explain further why you chose 2014 as a transition date? To what degree did this have any -- was this done to de-emphasize President Obama's promise to begin withdrawing U.S. forces this July?
SECRETARY: Well, first of all, I would say -- I think there's a certain misimpression that the transition to Afghan lead across the country will only take place at the end of 2014. First of all, this is a process that has already begun. The Afghan government and security forces already have the primary responsibility for security here in the Kabul area. And we expect to begin that transition, as NATO said, early next spring in other areas.
So this will be a process that spreads nationwide over time and will lead to a drawdown over that period of foreign forces in Afghanistan as the Afghans are able to take increasing lead. It will be gradual and it will be -- it will depend on the conditions on the ground.
But this is a process that will go on throughout this period, that's already begun, and that will conclude at the end of 2014. It isn't something that happens just at the end of 2014.
PRESIDENT KARZAI: (In English.) With regard to the abilities of the Afghan army and police, with regard to the training of the Afghan army, the number of soldiers that we have, the number of young officers under training and the older generation of officers, the country's doing very, very well.
Having said doing very, very well, we should not be misled by the facts today. Afghanistan would continue to require much more training, especially where we absolutely need to turn our army into an institution that can stay beyond the direct engagement of the international community, that can sustain itself as an institution, that has an officers cadre that is intellectually well equipped, that is -- that has settled down as an institution, like you have in the United States or Britain or India or, for that matter, Pakistan, as well.
Now, adding to this, of equal importance, I believe, is the equipping of the army. Right now we are equipped with vital weapons and the other day General Petraeus showed me in our regular weekly security meetings. I don't know, is that a secret, or is that supposed to be -- (laughter) -- okay -- showed me --
SECRETARY: Not anymore. (Laughs; laughter)
PRESIDENT KARZAI: Not anymore. Not anymore. Well, they shouldn't share things like that with presidents, you know. We are WikiLeaks -- we --. (Laughter.) That the Afghan army will be given thousands of armored vehicles and personnel-carrier vehicles.
Of course, for us to be a fundamentally strong country with an army that can defend itself and that can be an ally with you in the United States, we would require much more: a proper air power, proper mobility of our forces and an equipment that will be good enough to sustain our country as far as security is concerned.
On the 2014 date, this wasn't designed to preempt any other date. This was talked of as being the proper date by which we would have trained ourselves and equipped ourselves; proper enough so to take on the responsibility for securing our country.
(Cross talk.)
[...]
Q: (Through translator.) From Bakhtar TV, my question is to Mr. Secretary.
You have -- you said the fight will be tough ahead and the next years you'll be fighting a tough war. But you said -- you've made progress, but you said difficult days are lying ahead, and after 2014, when the war would be tough, while Afghans wouldn't be ready by then completely, it's believed. Do you think that the Afghan forces would be able to reach that level of providing for its own capacity to stop any of those threats that could turn out to be a threat against the U.S.?
And Mr. President, in the WikiLeaks it's been said that as your chief of staff has admitted and has acknowledged receiving bags of cash from Iran, and they might have influenced even the parliament to change their subject of discussions as well.
SECRETARY: Well, first of all, I think that we have to understand that the future here is not just about military operations. It's about economic development, and it's about political reconciliation, at the end of the day.
We think, based on the progress that's been made over the past year, that the Afghan security forces are making extraordinary strides. And it's not just in the added numbers, but it's in the increased quality of our partners that we gain increased confidence.
As President Karzai said, over the next several years we need to work together in terms of properly equipping the Afghan forces so they will be able to sustain themselves. But I think -- I think the important thing -- first of all, I think we're -- we believe that the security situation will be improved to the extent that in 2014 the Afghan security forces will be able to have the lead, as they do here in Kabul, across the entire country.
I made reference in my prepared remarks to the 'vision 2015' agreement that we're working on. The United States intends to continue to be a partner and ally of Afghanistan beyond 2014. We expect the same kind of normal security relationship that we have with many countries in terms of providing training and in terms of equipping and so on. So the United States is -- while we will draw down our security forces over the years to come, we intend to be here and be a long-term friend and ally to this country.
PRESIDENT KARZAI: I didn't understand your question very well on -- (inaudible) -- contributions or cash. After Mr. Daudzai I admitted there were other reports that -- without the cash that your office admitted. There were other also cash assistance from Iran trying to influence the agenda -- the overall agenda in Afghanistan, including that in the parliament to raise subjects of and to -- (inaudible) -- subjects.
So it is -- is that -- are you talking about the other money that we said we had received? Okay. I don't think Mr. Daudzai, my chief of staff, has said anything like that. This is not true. There's no truth in this. Because Iran, as we said, once a year and recently twice a year, made some cash assistance. And no extra cash was made. If there was made any, we would certainly let you know. But no, it was just that.
And on the reports or your question about their assistance to the Afghan parliament, we have no official confirmation of such reports, I believe. And we treat them as rumors, and there is nothing -- no truth about whatever they have done to the president's office. |
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Robert Gates |
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Secretary of Defense |
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Department of Defense |
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Afghan War Diary |
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Commanders in the field understand the advantage that comes from sharing intelligence and information and they do not want to give up that capability, the deputy assistant secretary of defense for cyber and space policy said in an interview here today.
Robert J. Butler said sharing information within the military, with coalition partners and even with outside agencies will continue, but there will be more controls placed on the information.
The WikiLeaks posting of stolen classified information has highlighted the tension between the strategy of 'share to win' and the necessity to enforce 'need to know.'
Share to win refers to the idea of getting information and intelligence out to the personnel who need it.
'Commanders in the field recognize ... it's really about coalition war-fighting, and it's about sharing information with partners,' Butler said. This is true whether the military is involved in humanitarian operations or warfighting.
Sharing information can range from the intelligence and information sharing the United States has with traditional military allies to non-governmental agencies.
'They are part of the fight, they are part of the recipe for success,' Butler said.
Need to know is the shorthand for how the department thinks about security, Butler said. 'It's about how information is shared, who has the information, for what purposes and for what period of time,' he said.
Butler does not see share to win and need to know as mutually exclusive. 'We need to share information to win and we also have to be conscious of the need to know,' he said.
Afghanistan is an example of both concepts. There are 48 countries in the coalition under NATO's International Security Assistance Force. The United States has the largest number of troops in the country and the largest intelligence/information-sharing network. 'We share information at different levels, based on the need,' Butler said.
Information sharing networks range from local to national in Afghanistan, he said. All are governed by policies that seek to balance share to win with need to know.
'Based on our agreements with countries and their mechanisms for how they control information, we look for ways we can bridge accountability within their workforce and commanders with what we're doing,' Butler said. 'In Afghanistan, where we have a joint task force and we're working on common objectives, it's clear what information needs are. Those needs are transmitted down to subordinate units and those will include coalition partners with information requirements that need to be satisfied.'
'We need to link the effects we want to achieve with an information-sharing approach,' he added.
The future will be more of the same, Butler said. 'What I see happening is an absolute recognition that we have to share information, and at the same time recognizing an increasing challenge from the cyber threat,' he said.
DOD is taking near-term steps to address that threat. Some of those steps include examining the content on the networks and examining the tactics, techniques and procedures used. 'A broader and longer-term perspective is an education program - one that helps them understand what classification means, how information is classified,' he said. 'Beyond the classification scheme, who has access to information?'
Butler also spoke about role-based access.
'You have this position, you have this mission, and we expect your access to stay open through this time,' he said. 'There are re-visit decision points and there is accountability up the chain [of command].'
'There are also ways to look for anomalies,' Butler continued, 'so if something happens and we expect this individual to have access to this information and that person is looking at something else, that should set off a flag to look at the situation. There may be a perfectly valid reason for the anomaly. But it could be another WikiLeaks situation.'
DOD is closing the window against potential threats and potential adversaries, Butler said, through technical retro-fitting, and through educational and accountability programs.
'This is part and parcel of what it means to be a soldiers, sailor, airman or Marine in the field protecting yourself, your comrades and your entire operation,' he said. |
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Name(s:) |
Robert Butler |
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Title: |
Deputy Secretary of Defense for Cyber and Space Policy |
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Agency(ies): |
Department of Defense |
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Q: Mr. Secretary, on Yemen, is there anything that you are asking some of the countries in the region to do? Is it funding? Is it training? And what more can -- specifically can the U.S. do there other than just spend more money?
SEC. GATES: Well, I think that as in -- and I kind of hinted at this at the embassy yesterday in Kabul, the key is getting in there before there's a crisis with economic assistance, with building partnership capacity. And I think that both the UAE and Oman are engaged in these activities, these development projects. Other countries are as well. The United States has some efforts ongoing in this respect, particularly in building partnership capacity. So I think it's that kind of thing. And I actually think that there are a number of countries that are trying to help.
MR. GEOFF MORRELL (Pentagon Press Secretary): We have time for one or two more.
Q: WikiLeaks -- now that WikiLeaks has come out with -- has made public some of the U.S. military action there, can you be more open and do you feel freer rein to do more of that now that it's out in the open?
SEC. GATES: Well, I never talk about military operations. I think we can be very open about the economic assistance and development work that we're doing there.
(Cross talk.)
MR. MORRELL: The last two.
Q: There was this Taliban impostor incident and then occasionally we've heard --
SEC. GATES: Sorry?
Q: There was this whole incident with the Taliban impostor came to -- and also there's so much speculation and discussion -- sorry -- about reconciliation and the state of it. Is there a danger that the U.S. or the Afghan government will look too eager for peace talks or some kind of reconciliation talks? And second of all, does that impostor incident suggest a problem generally that's been pointed out before that our intelligence picture is flawed, that we don't really understand what we need to understand about Afghanistan?
SEC. GATES: Well, I think we have a pretty good idea. It's not perfect by any means. I actually think that being open about reconciliation is different than looking eager. And as long as we have agreed criteria for what reconciliation means and stick to those criteria, I'm not worried about looking too eager. |
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Name(s:) |
Robert Gates |
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Title: |
Secretary of Defense |
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Department of Defense |
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Archive Link
http://archive.is/eZQvh |
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Title: |
Mullen Meets With Pakistanis to Align Interests, Goals |
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Author: |
Jim Garamone |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
American Forces Press Service, Department of Defense |
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Archive Link |
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Q: (Inaudible) quoted in the WikiLeaks cables here (inaudible) documents as saying that, you know, it's very hard to get tough with your banker. Do you talking about China. Do you have is that would you agree overall with that and because the Chinese have said that in some quarters they see us as a declining power because of our financial crisis, does that change the nature of the talks with the Chinese from 2007 to now?
SECRETARY GATES: Certainly not from my standpoint. My I make the broader point with people because I've watched this sort of cyclical view of American decline come around two or three times, perhaps most dramatically in the latter half of the 1970s. And my general line for those both at home and around the world who think the U.S. is in decline that history's dustbin is filled with countries that underestimated the resilience of the United States. And I think that I mean, the economic relationship between the United States and China is mutually beneficial. It's not a one-way street. And so I think both countries have an interest in keeping that stable and going forward. So I that kind of thing doesn't you know, the that kind of thing really doesn't much enter into in my thinking. |
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Name(s:) |
Robert Gates |
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Title: |
Secretary of Defense |
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Agency(ies): |
Department of Defense |
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Url Link
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Archive Link
http://archive.is/c4m3a |
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We consider this reporting from posts around the world to be one of our most valuable contributions to every facet of national security, and we share this diplomatic reporting through automatic dissemination to over 65 agencies based on profiled requirements these agencies provide to the Department. Recent events have not changed our commitment to sharing this vital information.
WikiLeaks Disclosures and State Department Mitigation Actions
July 2010
When DoD material was leaked in July 2010, we worked with DoD to identify any alleged State Department material that was in WikiLeaks' possession. We immediately asked Chiefs of Mission at affected posts to review any purported State material in the release and provide an assessment, as well as a summary of the overall effect the WikiLeaks release could have on relations with the host country.
Following the completion of the review in August, when it was believed that purported State cables might be released, the State Department instructed all Chiefs of Missions to familiarize themselves with the content in the Net Centric Diplomacy (NCD) database should a release actually occur.
[_]
November 2010
When the press and WikiLeaks announced that they were going to release purported State cables starting on November 28, 2010, the State Department took the following immediate actions: 1) Established a 24/7 WikiLeaks Working Group composed of senior officials from throughout the Department, notably our regional bureaus; 2) Created a group to review potential risks to individuals; and 3) Suspended SIPRNet access to NCD (SIPRNet is a DOD network).
The Department also created a Mitigation Team to address the policy, legal, security, counterintelligence, and information assurance issues presented by the release of these documents. During this period, the Department kept Congress apprised of both the international fallout caused by the WikiLeaks' disclosure and the steps undertaken to mitigate them. The Department convened two separate briefings for members of both the House of Representatives and the Senate within days (December 2, 2010) of the first disclosure by WikiLeaks and appeared twice before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (December 7 and 9, 2010).
[_]
Ongoing Mitigation Efforts
State continues its thorough review of policies and procedures related to information security to ensure that they fully meet the current challenges. Efforts are being coordinated throughout the Department, as well as with the interagency, to ensure that we share classified information in an effective and secure manner with those who need it in their work to advance our national security.
While the Department already had strong safeguards in place, we have further enhanced and updated our computer security policies that prohibit the downloading of classified information to removable media (e.g., thumb drives, CDs/DVDs) on the Department's classified network. The Department continues to deploy an automated tool that audits and monitors the Department's classified network to detect anomalies that would not otherwise be apparent. This capability is backed up by professional staff who promptly analyze detected anomalies to ensure that they do not represent threats to the system.
The NCD database of diplomatic reporting and the State Department's classified web sites, although now inaccessible through SIPRNet, remains available via the more limited distribution Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS). Throughout, the State Department has continued to share its diplomatic reporting among federal agencies through its traditional system of cable dissemination.
To heighten awareness of what is and is not permitted when working on the Department's classified network and on classified systems, user awareness reminders are now available for Department employees on its classified network, in addition to the standard in-person briefings about handling classified material and a soon-to-be-released computer-based course on identifying and marking classified and sensitive information.
In addition, the Department is exploring solutions to improve how we share and protect information with those who are not direct recipients of our telegrams. One such solution would involve the creation of a website with a searchable database that would allow appropriately cleared personnel to use key word searches to discover relevant State cables; the search would reveal cable metadata, such as the subject line, but would not provide the full text of the cables in a potentially vulnerable database. This would ensure that cleared personnel are aware of cables they have an operational or strategic need to see. Cleared personnel from other agencies would then be able to seek cables necessary for their work functions through their own organization's internal distribution system. The responsibility will be on the receiving, not the originating, agency to disseminate information to its internal personnel.
The Department has continued to work with the interagency on information management issues by participating in meetings of the new Interagency Policy Committee (IPC) chaired by the Special Advisor for Information Access and Security policy as well as existing IPCs such as the Information Sharing and Access IPC. |
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Name(s:) |
Patrick Kennedy |
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Title: |
Under Secretary for Management |
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Agency(ies): |
Department of State |
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Url Link
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Archive Link
http://archive.is/OfVrA |
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On August 12, 2010, immediately following the first release of documents, the Secretary of Defense commissioned two internal DoD studies. The first study, led by the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)), directed a review of DoD information security policy. The second study, led by the Joint Staff, focused on procedures for handling classified information in forward deployed areas. The Secretary also tasked the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency to stand up an Information Review Task Force to assess, in concert with interagency participants, the substance of the data disclosed.
Results of the two studies revealed a number of findings, including the following:
Forward deployed units maintained an over-reliance on removable electronic storage media.
Roles and responsibilities for detecting and dealing with an insider threat must be better defined.
Processes for reporting security incidents need improvement. Limited capability currently exists to detect and monitor anomalous behavior on classified computer networks.
Once the studies were concluded and the results reported to the Secretary, the Department began working to address the findings and improve its overall security posture to mitigate the possibility of another similar type of disclosure. Some of this work was already planned or underway. For other findings, like the issue of removable media, new initiatives had to be immediately implemented. |
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Name(s:) |
Teresa Takai, Thomas Ferguson |
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Title: |
Chief Information Officer, Principal Deputy Undersecretary |
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Agency(ies): |
Department of Defense |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/OfVrA |
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As the IC Information Sharing Executive (IC ISE), my main focus today concerns classified information - and, in particular, information that is derived from intelligence sources and menthols, or information that is reflected in the analytic judgements and assessments that the IC produces. I want to be clear, though, that our concern for the protection of information is not restricted to the fragility of sources and methods, but extends as well to broader aspects of national security. We recognize, and will hear today, that the Departments of State and Defense, as well as other federal agencies, themselves originate classified national security information that is vital to the protection of our nation and conduct of our foreign relations,a and this information, widely distributed, and used throughout the government to achieve these objectives. As we have seen recently, the unauthorized disclosure of any form of classified national security information has serious implications for the policy and operational aspects of national security. |
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Name(s:) |
Corin Stone |
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Title: |
Intelligence Community Information Sharing Executive |
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Agency(ies): |
Office of the Director of National Intelligence |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/OfVrA |
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In the five years since Congress directed the creation of the Information Sharing environment, significant steps have been taken towards establishing a string foundations. Important mission initiatives, such as the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative, and core capabilities and enablers, such as the National Network of Fusion Centers and the National Information Exchange Model, have produced results and show ongoing promise_
The WikiLeaks breach is not principally an information sharing problem; at its root a bad actor allegedly violated the trust placed in him. |
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Name(s:) |
Paul Kshemendra |
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Title: |
Program Manager for the Information Environment |
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Agency(ies): |
Office of the Director of National Intelligence |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/OfVrA |
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Takai told Senate members that Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates immediately called for two internal studies to review the department's information security policy and to unveil how classified information is handled in forward-deployed areas. The results showed that forward-deployed units had an 'over-reliance' on using removable electronic storage media, Takai said. |
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Name(s:) |
Terri Moon Crunk |
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Agency(ies): |
American Forces Press Service, Department of Defense |
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Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/4DMyk |
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Title: |
Information Sharing and WikiLeaks |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
C-SPAN |
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Title: |
Information Sharing in the Era of WikiLeaks: Balancing Security and Collaboration |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate |
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Archive Link |
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Title: |
Congressional Record |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
United States Government Printing Office |
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Title: |
Congressional Record |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
United States Government Printing Office |
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Title: |
Congressional Record |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
United States Government Printing Office |
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The spectrum of threats includes espionage, cyber intrusions, organized crime and the unauthorized disclosure of sensitive and classified US Government information, a notable recent example being the unlawful release of classified US documents by WikiLeaks. While the impacts of the WikiLeaks disclosures are still being assessed, we are moving aggressively to respond by protecting our information networks with improved CI analysis of audit and access controls, improving our ability to detect and respond to insider threats - while balancing the need to share information - and increase awareness across the US Government to the persistent and wide-ranging nature of foreign intelligence threats. |
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Name(s:) |
James Clapper |
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Title: |
Director of National Intelligence |
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Agency(ies): |
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, ODNI |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Senator MCCAIN [...] How serious is the damage to your capability to carrying out
your responsibilities was the WikiLeaks situation?
Mr. CLAPPER. Well, from my standpoint, it was quite damaging
because of the chilling effect it has on people who are willing to be
recruited and to provide information to us. And so, that's
Senator MCCAIN. So, it was a lot more than just embarrassing
to diplomats who
Mr. CLAPPER. Yes, sir.
Senator MCCAINwere candid in their assessments?
Mr. CLAPPER. And bear in mind, there are some potentially
700,000 documents out, that are out there, and there have only
been about 5,000 publicly revealed, so this could go on for quite
some time as these revelations are stretched out.
Senator MCCAIN. And it literally puts people's lives in danger
who were cooperating with us, whose names, identities may be revealed in these leaks, is that correct?
Mr. CLAPPER. That's possible. But I, frankly, am more concerned
about the ones we don't, we won't get in the future, that we can't
count, who won't engage with us because of fear of revelation.
Senator MCCAIN. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I bring that up because I'm intrigued by this debate that seems to go on that, well,
it's, we needed to know what our diplomats were saying to each
other, and we needed these candidthat's not what this is all
about is it?
Mr. CLAPPER. Well, the embarrassment factor, it makes for juicy
headlines and all that sort of thing. But that's not really what the
serious impact is. And of course, this wholeI should, not to dismiss that. That also is a negative effect of, the candor involved in
diplomatic discourse, diplomatic exchanges, I think will be affected.
I think, so farand certainly the dialogue I've had with foreign
interlocutors, while they're not happy about it, I think they see
that there is a larger interest here in a continued relationship with
the United Statesbut from an intelligence perspective, there's
been some damage. |
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Name(s:) |
James Clapper |
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Title: |
Director of National Intelligence |
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Agency(ies): |
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, ODNI |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Title: |
Congressional Record |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
United States Government Printing Office |
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Title: |
Statement for the Record on the Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Communities for the Senate Committee on Armed Services |
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Author: |
James Clapper |
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Title: |
Director of National Intelligence |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
Office of the Director of National Intelligence |
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Title: |
World Wide Threat Assessment: Statement before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 10 March 2011 |
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Classification: |
Unclassified |
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Author: |
Ronald Burgess |
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Title: |
Director |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
Defense Intelligence Agency, DIA, Department of Defense |
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Title: |
United States Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing Webcast |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
United States Senate Armed Services Committee |
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Title: |
Intelligence Chiefs Cite Greatest Security Threats |
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Author: |
Terri Moon Cronk |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
American Forces Press Service, Department of Defense |
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Archive Link |
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Name(s:) |
Donna Miles |
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Agency(ies): |
American Forces Press Service, Department of Defense |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/NLbDp |
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Title: |
Pentagon Official Addresses WikiLeaks, Social Media |
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Author: |
Donna Miles |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
American Forces Press Service, Department of Defense |
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Archive Link |
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MR. JOHNSON: My name is Jeh Johnson. I am the general counsel of the Department of Defense. We are here today to provide an update on the status of Army Private First Class Bradley Manning.
The Army is transferring Private Manning from the pre-trial confinement facility at Quantico to the new Joint Regional Correctional Facility at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. With me to answer questions about this matter are the Under Secretary of the Army, Joe Westphal, and Lieutenant Colonel Dawn Hilton, who is the commander of the Fort Leavenworth facility.
Before we take your questions, I want to spend a moment to explain the circumstances. At the request of Private Manning's defense counsel, an assessment is under way to determine whether Private Manning is mentally competent in this case in the event it goes to trial. On Saturday, April 9, the inquiry phase of that process, known in military justice terms as a 706 board, was completed, and Private Manning's presence in the Washington, D.C. area is no longer necessary for that purpose.
However, we are told that the medical opinion concerning Private Manning's competence to stand trial may take additional time. At this juncture of the case, we have decided that the new joint-regional correctional facility at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, is the most appropriate facility for Private Manning for continued pre-trial detention.
Army Corrections Command has reviewed the new facility and determined that it has the expertise and capability to provide continued long-term pre-trial confinement for Private Manning. The facility, which opened in October and opened a pre-trial confinement capability in January, is a state-of-the-art complex with the best and widest range of support services available to pre-trial prisoners within the Department of Defense corrections system, to include resident medical and mental-health care staff.
This facility is appropriate to meet Private Manning's health and welfare needs, given the possibility that he will remain in pre-trial confinement for an additional time during the 706 board process and the likelihood that the pre-trial phase of the case may continue for months beyond that. Colonel Hilton will be happy to answer questions about the facility. And I believe you have a fact sheet that provides some additional detail.
Within appropriate limits that must be established by the command of the facility, the Army will make the pre-trial facility at Fort Leavenworth available to a tour by a limited number of the press. It is also the case, like it was at Quantico, that Private Manning may receive a limited number of outside visitors, provided that Private Manning himself, as well as the command agrees that he can see them.
Private Manning will return to the Washington, D.C. area as needed for legal proceedings, as his case remains under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Army's military district of Washington.
It is important to remember that while Private Manning is charged with very serious offenses involving classified information and national security, in our system of military justice, as in our system of civilian justice in this country, he is presumed innocent until proven guilty. Pre-trial confinement, however, is common to both systems and has been determined to be appropriate in this case.
One final note. Many will be tempted to interpret today's action as a criticism of the pre-trial facility at Quantico. That is not the case. We remain satisfied that Private Manning's pre-trial confinement at Quantico was in compliance with legal and regulatory standards in all respects, and we salute the military personnel there for the job they did in difficult circumstances.
At this juncture of the case, given the likely continued period of pre-trial confinement, we have determined that the new pre-trial facility at Fort Leavenworth is the most appropriate one for Private Manning going forward.
We're now happy to answer your questions. Yes, ma'am.
Q: Sir, you said that there could be criticism or that there could be interpretations that this -- the pre-trial confinement was inappropriate, but that everything was followed by the letter of the law. At any point, do you think -- in your judgment, do you think that Private Manning, there was bad judgment used in the way that he was treated at Quantico; despite the fact whether it was by the letter of the law, that people who were running the facility at Quantico used bad judgment in the way he was treated?
MR. JOHNSON: No, I do not believe that.
I also know that I am the lawyer for the Department of Defense. I am not a corrections expert, and so I hesitate to second guess any of the judgments made by the personnel there in dealing with this particular confinee.
Q: Colonel Hilton, could I -- could I ask you if -- I mean, what is your assessment based on what you've --
LT. COL. HILTON: I don't know the specific details of Pfc. Manning's confinement. But what I do -- what I can tell you is that when he's transported to the Joint Regional Correctional Facility, he will receive -- will receive support from an experienced, trained professional staff that have been doing this for well over 20 years, and he'll receive the mental health, physical health and emotional health that he needs to go through this judicial process.
Q: When will he be transferred?
MR. JOHNSON: It's imminent. We don't normally provide precise details of the timing of such things, but it's imminent in the short term.
Q: This week?
LT. COL. HILTON: As a matter of policy, we don't discuss escort details. Though we don't discuss the details, we do this on a routine basis. This is what we do on a daily basis. When we perform these missions, they are very similar to the way the U.S. Marshals perform escorts, as well as other state and federal agencies. So this is what we do on a daily basis, and it will be formed --
MR. JOHNSON: I think you can assume that we would not be announcing this this far -- very far in advance.
Q: Wait, since this is -- I mean, this is pretty unusual to have a press conference late in the day announcing that you're moving a prisoner. Will you make an announcement when he's actually been checked in or whatever the term is that -- (inaudible)?
MR. JOHNSON: We don't have a plan to do that at the moment. I suspect that you all will become aware of that at the point at which he arrives at Leavenworth.
Q: When did it become apparent that Manning needed some special level of care that he wasn't getting at Quantico, and who made that recommendation or that decision?
MR. JOHNSON: Well, I wouldn't characterize it that way.
We've been thinking about this for a while. We began to take a fairly comprehensive look at Quantico as well as other facilities that have pre-trial confinement capability, and we concluded, after spending a couple of weeks on this, that at this juncture of the case, now that the 706 inquiry process is over -- and the interview of him as part of that process took place Saturday before last -- and given the fact that he's been in pre-trial confinement for I think about 10 months now, and Quantico is a facility that normally does not have pre-trial confinees for that length of time, and then when you look forward at the likely time before this case goes to trial, if it goes to trial, the combination of those plus the facility at Leavenworth, a new facility which has a pre-trial confinee capability that opened in January, led us to the conclusion at this juncture of the case it was -- it was a good thing to transfer him even though the case is going to stay in Washington.
STAFF: Secretary Westphal may have something to add to that.
MR. WESTPHAL: Well, I would just say that, you know, our responsibility -- you know, Private Manning is a -- is a soldier, and our responsibility as an Army is not only to adjudicate his case, but also to take care of him while he is in pre-trial confinement.
As the counsel mentioned, this particular facility -- there are two Army facilities at Leavenworth. One is the old barracks, which is for individuals after trial. This i |
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Name(s:) |
Jeh Johnson, Dawn Hilton |
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Title: |
General Counsel, Commander of the Joint Regional Correctional Factiliy at Fort Leavenworth Kansas |
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Agency(ies): |
Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning, Unlawful Pretrial Confinement, Article 13 |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/C1Qr7 |
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Title: |
Joint Regional Correctional Facility Fact Sheet |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
Joint Regional Correctional Facility, Fort Leavenworth Kansas, Departmnet of Defense |
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Concerning: |
"United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning, Unlawful Pretrial Confinement, Article 13 |
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Title: |
WikiLeaks soldier being moved to Fort Leavenworth. Pentagon Press briefing (FULL VERSION) |
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Author: |
3rdID8487 |
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Concerning: |
"United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning, Unlawful Pretrial Confinement, Article 13 |
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Title: |
Army to Transfer Manning to Leavenworth |
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Author: |
Donna Miles |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
American Forces Press Service, Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
"United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning, Unlawful Pretrial Confinement, Article 13 |
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Archive Link |
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Before we take your questions, I want to spend a moment to explain the circumstances. At the request of Private Manning's defense counsel, an assessment is under way to determine whether Private Manning is mentally competent in this case in the event it goes to trial. On Saturday, April 9, the inquiry phase of that process, known in military justice terms as a 706 board, was completed, and Private Manning's presence in the Washington, D.C. area is no longer necessary for that purpose.
However, we are told that the medical opinion concerning Private Manning's competence to stand trial may take additional time. At this juncture of the case, we have decided that the new joint-regional correctional facility at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, is the most appropriate facility for Private Manning for continued pre-trial detention.
[...]
He will remain in pre-trial confinement for an additional time during the 706 board process and the likelihood that the pre-trial phase of the case may continue for months beyond that.'
[...]
[F]airly lengthy process that began at the request of the defense [counsel] that involves assessing a bunch of things that include an interview of the -- of the pre-trial confinee. But it's an ongoing process, and the medical opinion of this board, it looks as if it won't be out for a little while. I'm not exactly sure. It could be a matter of weeks or so. And so -- but the -- the process, it involves his personal participation. It was done -- it was done on April 9. |
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Name(s:) |
Jeh Johnson |
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Title: |
General Counsel |
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Agency(ies): |
Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning, Unlawful Pretrial Confinement, Article 13 |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/SP0Tf |
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On 23 November 2011, I advised you of this investigation and your rights to counsel in this investigation. As you were in pretrial confinement, I provided that notification to your counsel. Counsel, when was your client provided with that notification? |
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Name(s:) |
Paul Almanza |
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Title: |
Investigating Officer, Chief of Staff |
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Agency(ies): |
United States Army, Department of Defense, Office of Legal Policy, Department of Justice |
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Concerning: |
United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Title: |
PFC Manning Article 32 Script |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
"United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning |
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Q: Thank you. Yes, President Karzai has been described in a trove of secret diplomatic American cables as erratic, problematic; and by -- and described by the American ambassador as not a reliable ally. Are those assessments incorrect? And how embarrassing is this for the United States?
SECRETARY GATES: Well, I would say that the WikiLeaks and -- leak -- revelation of all of these documents is extraordinarily embarrassing for the United States. But at the end of the day, nations make -- and leaders make decisions based on their interests. And I would say that America's best partners and friends -- and I include among them President Karzai -- have responded to this, in my view, in an extraordinarily statesmanlike way. And I'm deeply grateful. And frankly, I think the American government will not forget this kind of statesmanlike response.
I think I also could say, with great confidence, President Karzai and I have been meeting together privately now for four years, and I don't think either of us would be embarrassed to have a single thing we have said to each other made public.
So this relationship will go on, because it's in our interests, and we have a shared vision for this country.
[...]
Q As Secretary Gates indicated, U.S. and Afghan officials have both said that the training of Afghan security forces over the past year has gone better than projected. Does this mean that the government of Afghanistan could possibly take primary responsibility for its security before the end of 2014?
And President Karzai, could you explain further why you chose 2014 as a transition date? To what degree did this have any -- was this done to de-emphasize President Obama's promise to begin withdrawing U.S. forces this July?
SECRETARY: Well, first of all, I would say -- I think there's a certain misimpression that the transition to Afghan lead across the country will only take place at the end of 2014. First of all, this is a process that has already begun. The Afghan government and security forces already have the primary responsibility for security here in the Kabul area. And we expect to begin that transition, as NATO said, early next spring in other areas.
So this will be a process that spreads nationwide over time and will lead to a drawdown over that period of foreign forces in Afghanistan as the Afghans are able to take increasing lead. It will be gradual and it will be -- it will depend on the conditions on the ground.
But this is a process that will go on throughout this period, that's already begun, and that will conclude at the end of 2014. It isn't something that happens just at the end of 2014.
PRESIDENT KARZAI: (In English.) With regard to the abilities of the Afghan army and police, with regard to the training of the Afghan army, the number of soldiers that we have, the number of young officers under training and the older generation of officers, the country's doing very, very well.
Having said doing very, very well, we should not be misled by the facts today. Afghanistan would continue to require much more training, especially where we absolutely need to turn our army into an institution that can stay beyond the direct engagement of the international community, that can sustain itself as an institution, that has an officers cadre that is intellectually well equipped, that is -- that has settled down as an institution, like you have in the United States or Britain or India or, for that matter, Pakistan, as well.
Now, adding to this, of equal importance, I believe, is the equipping of the army. Right now we are equipped with vital weapons and the other day General Petraeus showed me in our regular weekly security meetings. I don't know, is that a secret, or is that supposed to be -- (laughter) -- okay -- showed me --
SECRETARY: Not anymore. (Laughs; laughter)
PRESIDENT KARZAI: Not anymore. Not anymore. Well, they shouldn't share things like that with presidents, you know. We are WikiLeaks -- we --. (Laughter.) That the Afghan army will be given thousands of armored vehicles and personnel-carrier vehicles.
Of course, for us to be a fundamentally strong country with an army that can defend itself and that can be an ally with you in the United States, we would require much more: a proper air power, proper mobility of our forces and an equipment that will be good enough to sustain our country as far as security is concerned.
On the 2014 date, this wasn't designed to preempt any other date. This was talked of as being the proper date by which we would have trained ourselves and equipped ourselves; proper enough so to take on the responsibility for securing our country.
(Cross talk.)
[...]
Q: (Through translator.) From Bakhtar TV, my question is to Mr. Secretary.
You have -- you said the fight will be tough ahead and the next years you'll be fighting a tough war. But you said -- you've made progress, but you said difficult days are lying ahead, and after 2014, when the war would be tough, while Afghans wouldn't be ready by then completely, it's believed. Do you think that the Afghan forces would be able to reach that level of providing for its own capacity to stop any of those threats that could turn out to be a threat against the U.S.?
And Mr. President, in the WikiLeaks it's been said that as your chief of staff has admitted and has acknowledged receiving bags of cash from Iran, and they might have influenced even the parliament to change their subject of discussions as well.
SECRETARY: Well, first of all, I think that we have to understand that the future here is not just about military operations. It's about economic development, and it's about political reconciliation, at the end of the day.
We think, based on the progress that's been made over the past year, that the Afghan security forces are making extraordinary strides. And it's not just in the added numbers, but it's in the increased quality of our partners that we gain increased confidence.
As President Karzai said, over the next several years we need to work together in terms of properly equipping the Afghan forces so they will be able to sustain themselves. But I think -- I think the important thing -- first of all, I think we're -- we believe that the security situation will be improved to the extent that in 2014 the Afghan security forces will be able to have the lead, as they do here in Kabul, across the entire country.
I made reference in my prepared remarks to the 'vision 2015' agreement that we're working on. The United States intends to continue to be a partner and ally of Afghanistan beyond 2014. We expect the same kind of normal security relationship that we have with many countries in terms of providing training and in terms of equipping and so on. So the United States is -- while we will draw down our security forces over the years to come, we intend to be here and be a long-term friend and ally to this country.
PRESIDENT KARZAI: I didn't understand your question very well on -- (inaudible) -- contributions or cash. After Mr. Daudzai I admitted there were other reports that -- without the cash that your office admitted. There were other also cash assistance from Iran trying to influence the agenda -- the overall agenda in Afghanistan, including that in the parliament to raise subjects of and to -- (inaudible) -- subjects.
So it is -- is that -- are you talking about the other money that we said we had received? Okay. I don't think Mr. Daudzai, my chief of staff, has said anything like that. This is not true. There's no truth in this. Because Iran, as we said, once a year and recently twice a year, made some cash assistance. And no extra cash was made. If there was made any, we would certainly let you know. But no, it was just that.
And on the reports or your question about their assistance to the Afghan parliament, we have no official confirmation of such reports, I believe. And we treat them as rumors, and there is nothing -- no truth about whatever they have done to the president's office. |
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Robert Gates |
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Secretary of Defense |
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Department of Defense |
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Q As Secretary Gates indicated, U.S. and Afghan officials have both said that the training of Afghan security forces over the past year has gone better than projected. Does this mean that the government of Afghanistan could possibly take primary responsibility for its security before the end of 2014?
And President Karzai, could you explain further why you chose 2014 as a transition date? To what degree did this have any -- was this done to de-emphasize President Obama's promise to begin withdrawing U.S. forces this July?
SECRETARY: Well, first of all, I would say -- I think there's a certain misimpression that the transition to Afghan lead across the country will only take place at the end of 2014. First of all, this is a process that has already begun. The Afghan government and security forces already have the primary responsibility for security here in the Kabul area. And we expect to begin that transition, as NATO said, early next spring in other areas.
So this will be a process that spreads nationwide over time and will lead to a drawdown over that period of foreign forces in Afghanistan as the Afghans are able to take increasing lead. It will be gradual and it will be -- it will depend on the conditions on the ground.
But this is a process that will go on throughout this period, that's already begun, and that will conclude at the end of 2014. It isn't something that happens just at the end of 2014.
PRESIDENT KARZAI: (In English.) With regard to the abilities of the Afghan army and police, with regard to the training of the Afghan army, the number of soldiers that we have, the number of young officers under training and the older generation of officers, the country's doing very, very well.
Having said doing very, very well, we should not be misled by the facts today. Afghanistan would continue to require much more training, especially where we absolutely need to turn our army into an institution that can stay beyond the direct engagement of the international community, that can sustain itself as an institution, that has an officers cadre that is intellectually well equipped, that is -- that has settled down as an institution, like you have in the United States or Britain or India or, for that matter, Pakistan, as well.
Now, adding to this, of equal importance, I believe, is the equipping of the army. Right now we are equipped with vital weapons and the other day General Petraeus showed me in our regular weekly security meetings. I don't know, is that a secret, or is that supposed to be -- (laughter) -- okay -- showed me --
SECRETARY: Not anymore. (Laughs; laughter)
PRESIDENT KARZAI: Not anymore. Not anymore. Well, they shouldn't share things like that with presidents, you know. We are WikiLeaks -- we --. (Laughter.) That the Afghan army will be given thousands of armored vehicles and personnel-carrier vehicles.
Of course, for us to be a fundamentally strong country with an army that can defend itself and that can be an ally with you in the United States, we would require much more: a proper air power, proper mobility of our forces and an equipment that will be good enough to sustain our country as far as security is concerned.
On the 2014 date, this wasn't designed to preempt any other date. This was talked of as being the proper date by which we would have trained ourselves and equipped ourselves; proper enough so to take on the responsibility for securing our country.
(Cross talk.)
[...]
Q: (Through translator.) From Bakhtar TV, my question is to Mr. Secretary.
You have -- you said the fight will be tough ahead and the next years you'll be fighting a tough war. But you said -- you've made progress, but you said difficult days are lying ahead, and after 2014, when the war would be tough, while Afghans wouldn't be ready by then completely, it's believed. Do you think that the Afghan forces would be able to reach that level of providing for its own capacity to stop any of those threats that could turn out to be a threat against the U.S.?
And Mr. President, in the WikiLeaks it's been said that as your chief of staff has admitted and has acknowledged receiving bags of cash from Iran, and they might have influenced even the parliament to change their subject of discussions as well.
SECRETARY: Well, first of all, I think that we have to understand that the future here is not just about military operations. It's about economic development, and it's about political reconciliation, at the end of the day.
We think, based on the progress that's been made over the past year, that the Afghan security forces are making extraordinary strides. And it's not just in the added numbers, but it's in the increased quality of our partners that we gain increased confidence.
As President Karzai said, over the next several years we need to work together in terms of properly equipping the Afghan forces so they will be able to sustain themselves. But I think -- I think the important thing -- first of all, I think we're -- we believe that the security situation will be improved to the extent that in 2014 the Afghan security forces will be able to have the lead, as they do here in Kabul, across the entire country.
I made reference in my prepared remarks to the 'vision 2015' agreement that we're working on. The United States intends to continue to be a partner and ally of Afghanistan beyond 2014. We expect the same kind of normal security relationship that we have with many countries in terms of providing training and in terms of equipping and so on. So the United States is -- while we will draw down our security forces over the years to come, we intend to be here and be a long-term friend and ally to this country.
PRESIDENT KARZAI: I didn't understand your question very well on -- (inaudible) -- contributions or cash. After Mr. Daudzai I admitted there were other reports that -- without the cash that your office admitted. There were other also cash assistance from Iran trying to influence the agenda -- the overall agenda in Afghanistan, including that in the parliament to raise subjects of and to -- (inaudible) -- subjects.
So it is -- is that -- are you talking about the other money that we said we had received? Okay. I don't think Mr. Daudzai, my chief of staff, has said anything like that. This is not true. There's no truth in this. Because Iran, as we said, once a year and recently twice a year, made some cash assistance. And no extra cash was made. If there was made any, we would certainly let you know. But no, it was just that.
And on the reports or your question about their assistance to the Afghan parliament, we have no official confirmation of such reports, I believe. And we treat them as rumors, and there is nothing -- no truth about whatever they have done to the president's office. |
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Hamid Karzai |
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Denise Lind |
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Denise Lind |
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Denise Lind |
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First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
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"United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning, Court Order or Ruling |
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20120315-(AE 30) Ruling (Defense Ex Parte Filing)_Redacted |
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Denise Lind |
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Chief Military Judge |
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First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
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"United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning, Court Order or Ruling |
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Denise Lind |
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"United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning, Court Order or Ruling |
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20120323-(AE 36) Ruling (Defense Motion to Compel Discovery) Redacted |
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Denise Lind |
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Chief Military Judge |
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"United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning, Court Order or Ruling |
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Denise Lind |
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Denise Lind |
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"United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning, Court Order or Ruling |
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Denise Lind |
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Chief Military Judge |
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First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
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"United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning, Court Order or Ruling |
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First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
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Chief Military Judge |
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"United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning, Court Order or Ruling |
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Denise Lind |
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First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
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"United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning, Court Order or Ruling |
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Denise Lind |
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Chief Military Judge |
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Chief Military Judge |
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20120622-(AE 147) Ruling (Compel Discovery - WTF) Redacted |
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20120622-(AE 273) Ruling (Motion to Compel Discovery 2) Redacted |
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Title: |
20120625-(AE 176) Ruling (Clarification of Discovery Order) Redacted |
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Author: |
Denise Lind |
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Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
"United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning, Court Order or Ruling |
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Archive Link |
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Title: |
20120625-(AE 177) Ruling (Due Diligence Accounting) Redacted |
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Author: |
Denise Lind |
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Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
"United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning, Court Order or Ruling |
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Archive Link |
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Title: |
20120717-(AE 212) Order (Government Motion Protective Order Addendum) Redacted |
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Author: |
Denise Lind |
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Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
"United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning, Court Order or Ruling |
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Archive Link |
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Title: |
20120718-(AE 216) Ruling (Prosecution Motion to Admit Evidence) Redacted |
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Author: |
Denise Lind |
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Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
"United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning, Court Order or Ruling |
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Archive Link |
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Title: |
20120718-(AE 218) Ruling (Def Renew Motion for Failure to State Offense) Redacted |
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Author: |
Denise Lind |
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Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
|
Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
"United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning, Court Order or Ruling |
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Archive Link |
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Title: |
20120719-(AE 219) Ruling (Lesser Included Offense Max Punishments) Redacted |
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Author: |
Denise Lind |
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Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
|
Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
"United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning, Court Order or Ruling |
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Archive Link |
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Title: |
20120719-(AE 221) Ruling (Government Motion to Preclude Harm) Redacted |
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Author: |
Denise Lind |
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Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
|
Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
"United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning, Court Order or Ruling |
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Archive Link |
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Title: |
20120719-(AE 222) Ruling (Defense Motion to Compel Discovery-DoS) Redacted |
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Author: |
Denise Lind |
|
Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
|
Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
"United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning, Court Order or Ruling |
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Archive Link |
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Title: |
20120719-(AE 274) Ruling (FBI Impact Statement MRE 505(g)(2) Redacted |
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Author: |
Denise Lind |
|
Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
|
Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
"United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning, Court Order or Ruling |
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Archive Link |
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Title: |
20120801-(AE 232) Ruling (Defense Request for Continuance)_Redacted |
|
Author: |
Denise Lind |
|
Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
|
Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
"United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning, Court Order or Ruling |
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Archive Link |
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Title: |
20120821-(AE 254) Order (Government MRE 505 Redactions-FBI) Redacted |
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Author: |
Denise Lind |
|
Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
|
Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
"United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning, Court Order or Ruling |
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Archive Link |
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Title: |
20120823-(AE 255) Ruling (Government Motion for MRE 505 Redactions - NCIX) Redacted |
|
Author: |
Denise Lind |
|
Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
|
Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
"United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning, Court Order or Ruling |
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Archive Link |
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Title: |
20120829-(AE 282) Ruling (Government Motion to Admit Evidence) Redacted |
|
Author: |
Denise Lind |
|
Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
|
Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
|
Concerning: |
"United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning, Court Order or Ruling |
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Archive Link |
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Title: |
20120830-(AE 284) Ruling (Government Motion MRE 505g2 - CIA 2) Redacted |
|
Author: |
Denise Lind |
|
Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
|
Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
"United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning, Court Order or Ruling |
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|
Archive Link |
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Title: |
20120830-(AE 285) Ruling (Government Motion MRE 505g2 - DIA) Redacted.pdf |
|
Author: |
Denise Lind |
|
Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
|
Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
|
Concerning: |
"United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning, Court Order or Ruling |
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|
Archive Link |
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Title: |
20120830-(AE 286) Order (Scheduling) Redacted |
|
Author: |
Denise Lind |
|
Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
|
Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
"United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning, Court Order or Ruling |
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Archive Link |
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Title: |
20120830-(AE 289) Order (Mental Health Professional) Redacted |
|
Author: |
Denise Lind |
|
Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
|
Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
|
Concerning: |
"United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning, Court Order or Ruling |
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|
Archive Link |
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Title: |
20120830-(AE 291) Order (Mental Health Professional) Redacted |
|
Author: |
Denise Lind |
|
Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
|
Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
|
Concerning: |
"United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning, Court Order or Ruling |
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|
Archive Link |
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Title: |
20120830-(AE 292) Order (Mental Health Professional) Redacted |
|
Author: |
Denise Lind |
|
Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
|
Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
|
Concerning: |
"United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning, Court Order or Ruling |
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|
Archive Link |
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Title: |
20120830-(AE 293) Order (Mental Health Professional) Redacted |
|
Author: |
Denise Lind |
|
Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
|
Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
|
Concerning: |
"United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning, Court Order or Ruling |
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|
Archive Link |
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Title: |
20120830-(AE 294) Order (Mental Health Professional) Redacted |
|
Author: |
Denise Lind |
|
Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
|
Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
|
Concerning: |
"United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning, Court Order or Ruling |
|
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|
Archive Link |
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Title: |
20120830-(AE 295) Order (Mental Health Professional) Redacted |
|
Author: |
Denise Lind |
|
Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
|
Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
|
Concerning: |
"United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning, Court Order or Ruling |
|
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|
Archive Link |
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Title: |
20120830-(AE 296) Order (Mental Health Professional) Redacted |
|
Author: |
Denise Lind |
|
Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
|
Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
|
Concerning: |
"United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning, Court Order or Ruling |
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|
Archive Link |
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Title: |
20120830-(AE 297) Order (Mental Health Professional) Redacted |
|
Author: |
Denise Lind |
|
Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
|
Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
|
Concerning: |
"United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning, Court Order or Ruling |
|
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|
Archive Link |
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Title: |
20120830-(AE 298) Order (Mental Health Professional) Redacted |
|
Author: |
Denise Lind |
|
Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
|
Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
|
Concerning: |
"United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning, Court Order or Ruling |
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|
Archive Link |
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Title: |
20120830-(AE 299) Order (Mental Health Professional) Redacted |
|
Author: |
Denise Lind |
|
Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
|
Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
|
Concerning: |
"United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning, Court Order or Ruling |
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|
Archive Link |
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Title: |
20120830-(AE 300) Order (Mental Health Professional) Redacted |
|
Author: |
Denise Lind |
|
Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
|
Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
|
Concerning: |
"United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning, Court Order or Ruling |
|
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|
Archive Link |
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Title: |
20120911-(AE 307) Order (Mental Health Professional 2) Redacted |
|
Author: |
Denise Lind |
|
Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
|
Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
|
Concerning: |
"United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning, Court Order or Ruling |
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|
Archive Link |
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Title: |
20120911-(AE 308) Order (Mental Health Professional) Redacted |
|
Author: |
Denise Lind |
|
Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
|
Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
|
Concerning: |
"United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning, Court Order or Ruling |
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|
Archive Link |
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Title: |
20120911-(AE 309) Order (Mental Health Professional) Redacted |
|
Author: |
Denise Lind |
|
Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
|
Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
|
Concerning: |
"United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning, Court Order or Ruling |
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|
Archive Link |
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Title: |
20120911-(AE 310) Order (Mental Health Professional) Redacted |
|
Author: |
Denise Lind |
|
Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
|
Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
|
Concerning: |
"United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning, Court Order or Ruling |
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|
Archive Link |
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Title: |
20120911-(AE 311) Order (Mental Health Professional) Redacted |
|
Author: |
Denise Lind |
|
Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
|
Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
|
Concerning: |
"United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning, Court Order or Ruling |
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|
Archive Link |
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Title: |
20120911-(AE 312) Order (Mental Health Professional) Redacted |
|
Author: |
Denise Lind |
|
Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
|
Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
|
Concerning: |
"United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning, Court Order or Ruling |
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|
Archive Link |
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Title: |
20120911-(AE 313) Order (Mental Health Professional) Redacted |
|
Author: |
Denise Lind |
|
Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
|
Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
|
Concerning: |
"United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning, Court Order or Ruling |
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Archive Link |
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Title: |
20120911-(AE 314) Order (Mental Health Professional) Redacted |
|
Author: |
Denise Lind |
|
Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
|
Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
|
Concerning: |
"United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning, Court Order or Ruling |
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|
Archive Link |
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Title: |
20120911-(AE 315) Order (Mental Health Professional) Redacted |
|
Author: |
Denise Lind |
|
Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
|
Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
|
Concerning: |
"United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning, Court Order or Ruling |
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|
Archive Link |
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Title: |
20120914-(AE 317) Ruling (Defense Motion to Compel 3) Redacted |
|
Author: |
Denise Lind |
|
Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
|
Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
|
Concerning: |
"United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning, Court Order or Ruling |
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Archive Link |
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Title: |
20121026-(AE 366) Ruling Clarification LIO Redacted |
|
Author: |
Denise Lind |
|
Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
|
Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
|
Concerning: |
"United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning, Court Order or Ruling |
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Archive Link |
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Title: |
20121101-(AE 374) Ruling Pros Req for Leave OCA Interog Redacted |
|
Author: |
Denise Lind |
|
Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
|
Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
|
Concerning: |
"United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning, Court Order or Ruling |
|
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|
Archive Link |
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|
Title: |
20121108-(AE 385) Scheduling Order Redacted.pdf |
|
Author: |
Denise Lind |
|
Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
|
Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
|
Concerning: |
"United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning, Court Order or Ruling |
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Archive Link |
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Title: |
20121108-(AE 386) Ruling Govt Motion to Redact Redacted |
|
Author: |
Denise Lind |
|
Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
|
Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
|
Concerning: |
"United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning, Court Order or Ruling |
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Archive Link |
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Title: |
20121119-(AE 389) Ruling Pros Req for Leave (Compel Motion) Redacted |
|
Author: |
Denise Lind |
|
Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
|
Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
|
Concerning: |
"United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning, Court Order or Ruling |
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Archive Link |
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Title: |
20121119-(AE 405) Court Order for Mental Health Professionals Redacted |
|
Author: |
Denise Lind |
|
Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
|
Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
|
Concerning: |
"United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning, Court Order or Ruling |
|
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Archive Link |
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Title: |
20121120-(AE 409) Ruling Pros Req for Leave (Govt Inter) Redacted |
|
Author: |
Denise Lind |
|
Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
|
Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
|
Concerning: |
"United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning, Court Order or Ruling |
|
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|
Archive Link |
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|
Title: |
20121126-(AE 410) Draft Instructions Redacted |
|
Author: |
Denise Lind |
|
Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
|
Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
|
Concerning: |
"United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning, Court Order or Ruling |
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Archive Link |
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Title: |
20121128-(AE 421) Ruling Proposed Pleas and Max Pun Redacted |
|
Author: |
Denise Lind |
|
Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
|
Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
|
Concerning: |
"United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning, Court Order or Ruling |
|
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|
Archive Link |
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|
Title: |
20121211-(AE 444) Scheduling Order_39a Session on Closure Redacted |
|
Author: |
Denise Lind |
|
Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
|
Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
|
Concerning: |
"United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning, Court Order or Ruling |
|
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|
Archive Link |
|
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|
Title: |
20121220-(AE 453) Order (Case Calendar) Redacted |
|
Author: |
Denise Lind |
|
Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
|
Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
|
Concerning: |
"United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning, Court Order or Ruling |
|
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|
Archive Link |
|
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|
Title: |
20130109-(AE 466) Order (Case Calendar) Redacted |
|
Author: |
Denise Lind |
|
Title: |
Chief Military Judge |
|
Authoring or Creator Agency: |
First Judicial Circuit, United States Army, Department of Defense |
|
Concerning: |
"United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning, Court Order or Ruling |
|
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|
Archive Link |
|
